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CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW
Henry P. Monaghan*
INTRODUCTION
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States' held that the clearly
erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)2 does not
prescribe the scope of appellate review of a finding of actual malice in
defamation cases governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.3 Rather, as
a matter of "federal constitutional law," 4 appellate courts "must exer-
cise independent judgment and determine whether the record estab-
lishes actual malice with convincing clarity." 5 Thus, in addition to the
familiar judicial duty to "say what the law is,"'6 the first amendment
imposes a special duty with respect to law application: both trial and
appellatejudges must examine the evidence, marshal the relevant adju-
dicative facts, 7 and then apply the controlling first amendment norms
to those facts.8 Appellate judges may accept the historical facts found
* Thomas M. Macioce Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1955, Univer-
sity of Massachusetts, Amherst; LL.B. 1958, Yale University; LL.M. 1960, Harvard Uni-
versity. A grant from the Rubin Foundation helped sustain research for this paper.
1. 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erro-
neous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses.").
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Constitution forbids recovery of damages by public officials
for defamation absent showing that statements were false and made with actual malice).
4. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1965.
5. Id. at 1967 (emphasis added). The Bose opinion needs unpacking and qualifica-
tion. See infra notes 58-99 and accompanying text.
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). While familiar, the con-
cept of independent judgment on questions of law is complex, permitting considerable
judicial deference to the lawmaking capacity of other institutional actors in both admin-
istrative and constitutional law. See Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State,
83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2-14, 25-26 (1983).
7. See infra note 16. The judge "marshals" the adjudicative facts by culling them
from the evidence presented and arranging them in a relevant sequence. See, e.g., Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 538-44, 548 n.12 (1965); P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro &
H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 591 (2d ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as Hart & Wechsler]. This "hard look" precludes any general
reliance in constitutional cases on the so-called "two court" doctrine. See infra notes
255-61 and accompanying text.
8. The judge need not assume the role of a thirteenth juror. As Bose indicates, 104
S. Ct. at 1959, there is no reason to believe that the judge is free to disregard the histori-
cal facts found by the jury in resolving disputed testimony. In some contexts, however,
the judge may function like a thirteenth juror where the crucial issues do not turn on
credibility. This occurs where, as in obscenity cases, the elements of the statutory of-
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in the court below, 9 but they may not defer to the first amendment law
application conclusions of even inferior article III judges, no matter
how "reasonable."
Although widely seen as an important victory for the media, 10 Bose
did not, as the Supreme Court claimed, present a "procedural question
of first impression."" The independent judgment rule had been
clearly stated in Sullivan itself,12 solidly embedded in the Court's prece-
dents,' 3 and applied by the court below.' 4 What is significant about
Bose is not its result, but its reasoning. Bose proffers a comprehensive
rationale for the independent judgment rule, one grounded entirely
upon concerns assertedly peculiar to the first amendment.' 5 But in-
dependent judgment in the first amendment context is merely one ex-
ample of a systemic issue: the scope of judicial review of the
adjudicative facts decisive of constitutional claims.' 6 This issue is tradi-
fense are identical with the factors that determine whether the speech is unprotected,
SeeJenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1973).
9. 104 S. Ct. at 1959. Of course, as Bose makes plain, see id. at 1967 n.31, the
independent law application requirement applies only to those facts decisive of the con-
stitutional claim. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951) (grant of review
to decide only whether statute constitutionally applied, not whether statute violated).
10. See High Court Calls for Special Care in Libel Appeals, N.Y. Times, May 1,
1984, at Al, col. 3. There is a surprisingly high rate of reversal by appellate courts in
cases where plaintiffs have prevailed on actual malice. "When analysis is confined to
review after a trial, 71% of defendants' appeals in cases involving rulings on actual mal-
ice have led to reversals." Brief of Amici at 17, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984); see also Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A
Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F.L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1983) (plaintiffs ulti-
mately secure favorable judgments in only 5 to 10%o of all libel cases against media
defendants). Moreover, the press seems increasingly distrustful of the role of the jury in
defamation cases. See, e.g., Kaplan, CBS News Chief Hints at Doubt On Libel Case,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1984, at B7, col. 1.
11. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1953.
12. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964); Kalven, The
New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 220.
13. See Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1962-65. The Court noted that the precedents most
frequently involved application of the independent judgment rule "in cases to which
Rule 52(a) does not apply because they arose in state courts." Id. at 1959. That distinc-
tion does not seem significant. In my view, Congress could provide for different scopes
of Supreme Court review over the factfinding of state and federal courts, on the premise
that state courts could not be "trusted." See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; id. amend.
XIV, § 5. But, absent congressional direction, I agree with the substance of the Court's
remark that "surely it would pervert the concept of federalism for this Court to lay claim
to a broader power of review over state court judgments than it exercises in reviewing
the judgments of intermediate federal courts." Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1959. Moreover, the
Court had previously assumed that independent judgment was required in libel cases
originating in the federal trial courts. See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971).
14. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 692 F.2d 189, 195 (1st
Cir. 1982).
15. See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
16. Adjudicative facts tend to be litigation specific; they are "[fQacts pertaining to
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tionally raised under the rubric of the constitutional fact doctrine.1 7 In
a great variety of contexts the pressing question is the extent to which
the Constitution itself controls the allocation of functions among the
various decisionmakers-appellate and trial judges, juries, administra-
tive agencies-that commonly participate at some stage in the resolu-
tion of all types of constitutional claims. Bose provides an appropriate
occasion to reconsider the role of appellate courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, in constitutional fact review.
In Bose, the fundamental disagreement between the Court and the
three dissenting justices was how to characterize the question
presented-whether the defendant acted with actual malice. The ma-
the parties and their businesses and activities." 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§ 12:3, at 413 (2d ed. 1979); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201 advisory committee note ("Adju-
dicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case."). Legislative facts, on the other
hand, "do not usually concern the immediate parties but are the general facts which help
the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion." 2 K. Davis, supra,
§ 12:3, at 413. The adjudicative facts decisive of constitutional claims usually pertain to
the concrete application of a statute or regulation being challenged on constitutional
grounds. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (zoning law chal-
lenged as applied). See generally Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1055, 1067-72 (1932) (genesis of as-applied review). Constitutional fact review thus
does not implicate the legislative facts that underlie the statute or regulation in its gen-
eral application. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984); Landmark Commu-
nications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843-44 (1978); The Supreme Court, 1983
Term, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 87, 214 n.56 (1984). On the deferential judicial review ordina-
rily given to findings of legislative fact, see Pilchen, Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding
When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-
Civil War Amendments, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 337 (1984); Note, Anti-Pornography
Laws and First Amendment Values, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 460, 476-80 (1984).
Of course, no wholly satisfactory criteria exist for distinguishing between adjudica-
tive and legislative facts, and for that reason the categories are at best "only an ap-
proach." Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1268 (1975).
Like other legal distinctions, the difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is
one of degree, and for that reason the existence of borderline cases does not mean that
the distinction is empty. Nonetheless, the lack of precision is of some significance given
the traditional rule that a litigant's right to a trial-type hearing before an administrative
agency depends on whether adjudicative or legislative facts are at issue. Compare
United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 244 (1973) (applying "basic distinc-
tion between rulemaking and adjudication"), with Friendly, supra, at 1307-09 (disputing
usefulness of this distinction as a means to determine right to trial-type hearing).
17. The term "constitutional fact" was first used by Professor Dickinson in his in-
sightful analysis of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), and its antecedents. See
Dickinson, supra note 16. On the general development of the constitutional fact doc-
trine, see L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 624-53 (1965); Larson, The
Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 15 Temp. L.Q. 185 (1941); Strong, The Persistent
Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 46 N.C.L. Rev. 223 (1968). Bose carefully avoids us-
ing the term "constitutional fact," mentioning it only once, in a footnote, and even then
tying it to the first amendment. See 104 S. Ct. at 1964 n.27 (" 'The simple fact is that
First Amendment questions of "constitutional" fact compel this Court's de novo re-
view.' ") (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 54 (1971) (plurality
opinion)).
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jority viewed the question as one of first amendment law application,
deserving of the Court's independent judgment. t8 The dissenters
viewed the question as simply one of historical fact governed by Rule
52(a). 19 For both groups, the initial characterization determined the
appropriate scope of appellate review.
It is not surprising that the justices in Bose were unable to agree on
the proper characterization of the question presented. The difficulty
has its origins in the "vexing" distinction between "questions of law"
and "questions of fact." 20 This distinction has long caused perplexity
in such diverse areas as contracts, 2 1 torts, 22 and administrative law.2 3
18. Id. at 1949, 1967.
19. Id. at 1968 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting); id. at 1967 (White,j., dissenting).
20. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
21. Long ago, Professor Thayer commented on "[t]he reasons for leaving ques-
tions as to the meaning and construction of writing to thejudges." Thayer, "Law and
Fact" injury Trials, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 147, 160 (1890). It is not "that these are questions
of law, for, mainly, they are not." Id. (footnote omitted). Rather, Thayer understood
the allocation to rest on "ground[s] of policy": "[s]uch things, so important, so long
enduring, should have a fixed meaning; should not be subject to varying interpretations;
should be interpreted by whatever tribunal is most permanent, best instructed, most
likely to adhere to precedents." Id. at 161.
Antilles S.S. Co. v. Members of Am. Hull Ins. Syndicate, 733 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1984), provides a recent illustration of the confusion as to whether the interpretation of
a contract is a question of law or fact. At issue was a shipowner's claim of coverage
under a marinery hull and machine insurance policy. The evidence consisted of the
policy and the testimony of two witnesses. The court of appeals said that analysis should
center on the "parties' mutual understanding," an inquiry that embraced the "language
of the policy and the circumstances surrounding its execution, custom and usage, as well
as the established law." Id. at 199. Branding the "central question" both as "a mixed
question of law and fact" and as one of "ultimate 'fact,'" id., the court set aside as
clearly erroneous the trial court's finding for the plaintiff. Judge Newman's thoughtful
concurring opinion contains a comprehensive examination of the allocation problem.
He rejects the view of the leading text writers that the construction of a contract is al-
ways a question of fact, see 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, A Comprehensive Trea-
tise on the Rules of Contract Law § 554 (1960); 4 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of
Contracts, § 616 (3d ed. 1961), in favor of the view that it is such a question only if
extrinsic evidence is relied upon. 733 F.2d at 204. judge Newman thus voted with the
majority to reverse, not because the lower court's finding was clearly erroneous, but
because he believed that the lower court's conclusion was wrong as a matter of law. Id.
at 207.
22. In torts, questions relating to negligence cause the most difficulty since the law
to be applied is a standard: whether the defendant acted as a reasonable man would
have under the circumstances. Traditionally, application of the reasonableness standard
to the facts is for the jury. Since "the legal profession has so long accepted it as axio-
matic that the jury has no power except to find facts," Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law
and Fact, 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 111, 114 (1924), determinations whether a defendant acted
negligently have generally been spoken of as "mixed questions of law and fact." Id. at
112. According to Professor Bohlen, "it is time to recognize that this supposed axiom is
not accurate." Id. at 115. He is surely right. In deciding questions of negligence, the
jury is called upon to exercise its judgment to formulate a more precise standard by
which to evaluate some particular act or omission. Strictly speaking, this task is neither
factfinding nor law declaration. Thus, the allocation of negligence questions to the jury
[Vol. 85:229
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Some would insist that this condition exists because the asserted dis-
tinction is fundamentally incoherent. 24 The incoherence argument
seems greatly overdrawn 25 once it is recognized that any distinction
posited between "law" and "fact" does not imply the existence of
static, polar opposites. Rather, law and fact have a nodal quality; they
are points of rest and relative stability on a continuum of experience.
In our legal system, the categories have functioned as crucially impor-
tant constructs that permit us to understand, organize, and regulate
certain forms of social experience. 26 Most important, they find expres-
sion in the constitutional text. Article III invests Congress with power
rests on grounds of policy, not on abstract conceptions of the intrinsic nature of the
question itself. Cf. Antilles S.S. Co. v. Members of Am. Hull Ins. Syndicate, 733 F.2d
195, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concurring) (determination of negligence
could be viewed as a question of law, but is left to the jury for practical reasons).
23. See L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 546-55. It must be noted, however, given the
broad delegation of power-especially rulemaking power-to administrative agencies,
that they necessarily possess considerable lawmaking authority. See Monaghan, supra
note 6, at 25-26.
24. This attitude has always had prominent adherents.
["Law" and "fact" are] equally expansible and collapsible terms .... It is
readily acknowledged that the term "law" is indefinable. No less difficult to
bound is the orbit of that companionate phantom "fact." . . . No two terms of
legal science have rendered better service than "law" and "fact." They are
basic assumptions; irreducible minimums and the most comprehensive maxi-
mums at the same instant. They readily accommodate themselves to any mean-
ing we desire to give them. . . . What judge has not found refuge in them?
The man who could succeed in defining them would be a public enemy.
L. Green, Judge and Jury 270 (1930).
In truth, the distinction between "questions of law" and "questions of fact"
really gives little help in determining how far the courts will review; and for the
good reason that there is no fixed distinction. They are not two mutually exclu-
sive kinds of questions, based upon a difference of subject-matter. Matters of
law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach upward, with-
out a break, into matters of law. The knife of policy alone effects an artificial
cleavage at the point where the court chooses to draw the line between public
interest and private right. It would seem that when the courts are unwilling to
review, they are tempted to explain by the easy device of calling the question
one of "fact"; and when otherwise disposed, they say that it is a question of
"law."
J. Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States 55
(1927) (emphasis in original).
25. Seemingly, this skepticism draws support from important and widely accepted
currents in modern thinking. The first is that facts are "theory-soaked," a phrase I be-
lieve used by Karl Popper. Necessarily, therefore, perceptions of what counts as a "fact"
are influenced by value judgments and theories, legal and otherwise. Second, there is
the danger of epistemic mistake-namely, characterizing what are really value judg-
ments as facts. See N. Elias, What is Sociology 42-43 (1970) ("[T]he idea that suppos-
edly immutable rules of logic are indeed regular patterns found in all human thought,
rests upon the unheeded confusion of facts with values."). The general criticisms have
force particularly with respect to legislative facts. But our focus here is on adjudicative
facts. See supra note 16.
26. Monaghan, supra note 6, at 4.
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over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction "both as to Law and
Fact,"127 and the seventh amendment provides that "no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined. . . than according to the rules of
the common law."128 Quite clearly, any analysis that purports to take
the constitutional text seriously must try to make some sense out of
these categories.
The confusion exhibited in judicial opinions over law and fact
stems from two sources. First, courts assume that the properly affixed
characterization necessarily determines which legal actor is assigned
the decisionmaking task. Second, the two categories have been used to
describe at least three distinct functions: law declaration, fact identifica-
tion, and law application. 29
To be sure, the categories of law and fact have traditionally served
an important regulatory function in distributing authority among vari-
ous decisionmakers in the legal system.30 But there is no imperative
that a properly affixed characterization necessarily controls allocation
of functions.3' And, quite plainly, the actual distribution of authority
between judges and other decisionmakers has often been governed by
other factors, such as the nature of the substantive issue and the charac-
ter of the decisionmakers. 32 That is, viewing the statutory or common
law scheme as a whole, the judges decide on an "appropriate" division
of functions between themselves and others engaged in the law-declar-
ing or law-applying process.33 The difficulty comes when the judges
27. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. The apparent power of the Supreme Court to
review factual findings by a civil jury was a repeated target of criticism and spurred the
seventh amendment. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 21.
28. U.S. Const. amend. VII. The seventh amendment has not been held applicable
either in administrative proceedings, see Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95
(1974), or in the context of appellate review of constitutional law application by lower
courts. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 n.26 (1964).
29. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law 374-76 (tent. ed. 1958).
30. For example, it is often said that "questions of law" are for judges and "ques-
tions of fact" for thejury. See, e.g., Thayer, supra note 21, at 147.
31. In every area, as Professor Thayer long ago observed, "judges have always an-
swered a multitude of questions of ultimate fact involved in the issue. It is true that this
has often been disguised by calling them questions of law." Id. at 159; see also Ram
Constr. Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1052 (3d Cir. 1984) ("When the
question is one of contract interpretation, the difference between factual and legal con-
clusions is often confused with the assignment of functions between court and jury.").
32. See Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1960 n.17.
33. For example, though the question of negligence may involve considerable
norm elaboration, a function ordinarily performed by judges, the question has long
been viewed as one for thejury. See L. Green, supra note 24, at 153-85; Bohlen, supra
note 22, at I 11-12; supra note 22. On contracts, see supra note 21. The field of admin-
istrative law provides another illustration, for it is now quite clear that agencies can be
empowered with significant law declaration competence. See Monaghan, supra note 6,
at 2-7, 25-3 1. Thus, to characterize an issue as one of "law" is not to decide that it falls
within the province of the court rather than the administrative agency.
[Vol. 85:229
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seek to force such allocation decisions into the conventional categories
of law and fact. Distortions in the analytic content of the categories
occur. These distortions are wholly unnecessary if we separate the alloca-
tive uses from the analytic content of these categories.
With this distinction in mind, we can sort out more clearly our
ideas about the analytic content of law and fact. Law declaration in-
volves "formulating a proposition [that] affects not only the [immedi-
ate] case . . . but all others that fall within its terms."3 4 In a strict
sense, then, law declaration yields only what we commonly think of as
"law"-conclusions about the existence and content of governing legal
rules, standards, and principles. The important point about law is that
it yields a proposition that is general in character.
Fact identification, by contrast, is a case-specific inquiry into what
happened here.35 It is designed to yield only assertions that can be made
without significantly implicating the governing legal principles.3 6 Such
assertions, for example, generally respond to inquiries about who,
when, what, and where-inquiries that can be made "by a person who is
ignorant of the applicable law." T3 7 It should be noted that this analysis
does not depend on the legal equivalent of the epistemological doc-
34. H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 29, at 374-75; see Michael & Adler, The Trial of
an Issue of Fact (pt. 1), 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1224, 1241-43 (1934). I omit here the dis-
tinctive problems raised by so-called "private" bills, such as legislation conferring
citizenship.
35. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 29, at 375; Michael & Adler, supra note 34,
at 1241-43; Morris, Law and Fact, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1303, 1304-06, 1326 (1942).
36. See Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 855 (1985) ("[t]he trial judge is of
course applying some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears, but his predomi-
nant function ... involves credibility findings"). Of course, "Rule 52(a) does not in-
hibit an appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including ... a finding of fact
that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law." Bose, 104 S. Ct.
at 1960; cf. Wiesberg v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1496 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (fact identification influenced by an erroneous legal standard may be overturned
as clearly erroneous).
37. L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 548. Inferences drawn from such assertions are also
facts, so long as they rest on general experience. Id. at 549; see United States v.
Kowalchuck, 744 F.2d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 1984). I would also include as facts terms that
are used to classify for legal purposes, but whose legal content is not at issue in the case
at hand. See L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 550-51; see also Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct.
844, 855 (1985) (prospective juror's "bias" with respect to capital punishment is a fac-
tual issue). Professor Jaffe notes that special difficulties are involved where facts are
themselves constructed from statistical data or are otherwise the result of a complex set
of inferences. Regarding the confiscation rate cases, see infra notes 112-26 and accom-
panying text, Jaffe writes:
The "facts" themselves-value of investment, costs of service, value of service,
rate of return-are abstract. They are derived from a mass of statistical data
which is in turn abstract, the result of a sophisticated classification of the under-
lying data. If the annual rate of depreciation of assets of a billion dollar corpo-
ration is a "fact," it is nevertheless a very different kind of fact from the bigness
of Cyrano's nose.
L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 646.
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trine of naive realism; the question is "not whether the fact exists in an
absolute sense but whether the evidence is adequate to justify the exer-
cise of [the decisionmaker's] power."'3 8 This means that while "what
happened" may be viewed as a question of fact, the legal sufficiency of
the evidence 39 may be viewed as the equivalent of a question of law".4
Law application, the third function, is residual in character. It in-
volves relating the legal standard of conduct to the facts established by
the evidence. 41 If all legal propositions could be formulated in great
detail, this function would be rather mechanical and require no distinc-
tive consideration. But such is not the case. Linking the rule to the
conduct is a complex psychological process, one that often involves
judgment. The more general the rule, the larger the domain for judg-
ment.42 Thus, law application frequently entails some attempt to elab-
orate the governing norm. But in contrast to the generalizing feature
of law declaration, law application is situation-specific; any ad hoc norm
elaboration is, in theory, like a ticket good for a specific trip only.
Moreover, in this kind of situation, specific norm elaboration is gener-
ally invisible. 43 By definition, when law application occurs, further ex-
plicit norm elaboration ceases. And any implicit norm elaboration may
be buried in a general verdict and in the decisionmaker's resolution of
the controversy over the facts. The typical jury verdict in a negligence
case provides a good example.44
Quite plainly, anterior to law application a crucial policy decision
must be made: should a further effort at norm elaboration be under-
38. Id. at 551 (emphasis omitted).
39. The relevant constitutional provision fixes the standard of what is legally suffi-
cient, and that is frequently greater than a simple preponderance of the evidence. See,
e.g., Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1965 n.30 (first amendment requires "clear and convincing"
evidence of actual malice in public figure defamation cases); Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1984) (due process clause requires "clear and convincing" evidence of child
neglect in proceedings to terminate parental rights); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(due process clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases).
40. See L.Jaffe, supra note 17, at 595-99. The no-evidence rule is illustrative. See
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380,
385 (1927); Creswill v. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912). A
similar rule has long obtained in the field of administrative law. See, e.g., Florida E.
Coast Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 167, 185 (1914) ("where it is contended that an
order whose enforcement is resisted was rendered without any evidence whatever to
support it, the consideration of such a question involves not an issue of fact, but one of
law"); ICC v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91-92 (1913).
41. If an erroneous legal standard is used as the predicate for law application, the
reviewing court will set the conclusion aside because it rests on a legal error. See Bose,
104 S. Ct. at 1960; United States v. Kowalchuk, 744 F.2d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 1984).
42. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 29, at 375.
43. There may be some cases where the norm elaboration can be discerned by the
court on appeal; that is, the court may be able to say that the law application decision
must have rested on a certain norm elaboration that was either correct or incorrect.
44. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 29, at 379; supra note 22.
[Vol. 85:229236
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taken? 45 For example, should the "recklessness" component of Sulli-
van's actual malice standard be amplified to provide more detailed
guidance on the frequently recurring question of whether a reporter
must check his sources? 46 Such policy decisions draw upon complex
considerations that must be faced at each level of the proceeding.
47
Law application decisions in the lower federal courts may lead the
Supreme Court to believe that further norm elaboration is needed.
48
Still, the important point for our purposes is that law declaration occurs
only to the extent that further general norm elaboration occurs.
In light of the foregoing, it seems misguided to assume, as many
courts apparently do, that all law application judgments can be dis-
solved into either law declaration or fact identification.49 Law applica-
tion is a distinctive operation.50 The real issue is not analytic, 5i but
allocative: what decisionmaker should decide the issue?52 Our system
has not proceeded on the premise that judges, to say nothing of appel-
late judges, must render independent judgment on all law application.
Many such decisions are left in the hands ofjuries, masters, and admin-
45. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 29, at 376.
46. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). For other refer-
ences, see Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1984).
47. See infra notes 234-54.
48. Of course, a series of law application decisions may impel a court to undertake
explicit norm elaboration. See 0. Holmes, The Common Law 96-103 (M. Howe ed.
1963). This is especially true where appeals are taken and opinions written. The court
on appeal will be impelled to give a rule formulation for the various factual instances it
has considered, particularly if they present a recurring core situation. See United States
v. Boyle, 105 S. Ct. 687, 692 n.8 (1985); H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 29, at 382; see
also J. Dickinson, supra note 24, at 317 n.21 (warning that legal standards evolved from
specific fact patterns, "if laid down by judges, will be taken as of general application and
applied to other cases as well").
49. In both Ram Constr. Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1053 (3d
Cir. 1984), and United States v. Kowalchuk, 744 F.2d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third
Circuit did not recognize that law application is a distinct mental process. Compare
Lord Denning's suggestion that the law application decision should be analyzed func-
tionally: "If, and so far as, [inferences from primary facts] can as well be drawn by a
layman (properly instructed on the law) as by a lawyer, they are conclusions of fact for
the tribunal of fact .... " British Launderers' Research Ass'n v. Hendon Rating Auth.,
[1949] 1 K.B. 462, 471-72. For a discussion of law application in English administrative
law, see Emery & Smythe, Error of Law in Administrative Law, 100 Law Q. Rev. 612
(1984).
50. Long ago, Holmes emphasized the difference between asking whether a person
"has done or omitted certain things" and whether "his alleged conduct. . . come[s] up
to the legal standard." 0. Holmes, supra note 48, at 97. And surely there is a distinc-
tion between what a speaker said and did, and whether that conduct constitutes "actual
malice" within the Sullivan rule.
51. H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 29, at 376 (whether law application raises a
question of" 'law' or 'fact' cannot be derived from the inherent characteristics of the
question").
52. Id. But even if the judge decides the issue, how it is characterized can have
important implications for the scope of appellate review and for the precedential effect
of a decision. Id. at 380.
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istrative agencies. Bose confirms this point. The Court assumed that,
but for the Constitution, no independent appellate review would be re-
quired. It did not hold that all questions of law application should be
assimilated to law declaration so that Rule 52(a) has no applicability.53
A contrary holding would have rendered the independent judgment
rule in constitutional cases simply a subset of law application in gen-
eral, always to be viewed as essentially a "question of law."'54
Viewed in this way, the key question is whether constitutional law
application differs from ordinary law application. Bose provides an af-
firmative answer, but attempts to limit it to the first amendment con-
text. Yet Bose presents simply one example of constitutional fact
review, and the Court's reasoning is not easily confined to the first
amendment context. We commonly assume that there is something
distinctive about judicial review of the adjudicative facts decisive of any
constitutional claim. This Article examines what that assumption im-
plies about the proper scope of constitutional fact review in the appel-
late courts.
Constitutional fact review presupposes that appellate courts will
render independent judgment on any issues of constitutional "law"
presented. Its distinctive feature is a requirement of similar independ-
ent judicial judgment on issues of constitutional law "application."
That is, the courts must sort out the relevant facts and apply to them
the controlling constitutional norms. Firmly embedded case law estab-
lishes that, absent limiting legislation, federal appellate courts, particu-
larly the Supreme Court, possess that authority. This Article will argue,
however, that constitutional fact review at the appellate level is a matter
for judicial (and legislative) discretion, not a constitutional imperative.
This discretion can be made responsive to important institutional
53. Indeed, in assuming that Rule 52(a) applied to questions of "ultimate fact," 104
S. Ct. at 1959-60, the Supreme Court impliedly rejected that conclusion. Compare the
Ninth Circuit's casual treatment of the issue in Taylor v. Moram Agencies, 739 F.2d
1384, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1984) (appellate review of law application not restricted by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 52(a)). Still, the Court has not been consistent on this point even outside the
field of constitutional law. Compare Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671
(1944) ("[T]he conclusion that may appropriately be drawn from the whole mass of
evidence is not always the ascertainment of the kind of 'fact' that precludes considera-
tion by this Court."), with Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286-87 & n.16
(1982) (criticizing Baumgartner on the ground that Rule 52(a) does not make exceptions
or purport to exclude certain categories of factual findings). Moreover, one commenta-
tor has argued that the text and legislative history of Rule 52(a) demonstrate the
drafter's intent that it apply only to "strictly factual matters" and not to matters of law
application. See Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A
Comparative Analysis, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 113-15 (1944).
54. The proposed amendment to Rule 52(a) gives district judges a greater explicit
role in law application. See Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), 98 F.R.D. 337, 359 (1983)
("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and to the need forfinality.") (emphasis in original).
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needs. The most important of these are the danger of systemic bias of
other actors in the judicial system and the need for continuous develop-
ment of constitutional principles on a case-by-case basis. But appellate
courts are under no inexorable compulsion to review every application
of settled constitutional norms to the historical facts. 55 Law declara-
tion, not law application, is the appellate courts' only constitutionally
mandated duty.56 And, considered afresh, I see no compelling consid-
erations for positing a different principle for the first amendment.
In the process of this argument this Article will contrast the role of
appellate courts with that of courts asked to enforce the constitutional
law application decisions of administrative agencies. 57 In the latter
context a strong argument can be made that enforcement tribunals must
undertake constitutional fact review. Indeed, in that context constitu-
tional fact review may entail even more: the court may be required in-
dependently to find the relevant historical facts on the basis of its own
record. But the reasons for these requirements are rooted in the "legit-
imacy deficit" inherent in administrative adjudication. The rise of ad-
ministrative adjudication is at variance with the original constitutional
premise that most adjudication would take place in judicial, not admin-
istrative, tribunals. Constitutional fact review in the context of judicial
review of administrative conduct seeks to ameliorate that legitimacy
deficit. So viewed, it does not establish the propriety of a similar scope
of review by an appellate court over the decisions of an inferior court.
I. INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States
Bose began as a trade libel suit in a district court. Consumers
Union had published a magazine article evaluating the qualities of nu-
merous brands of loudspeaker systems, including one marketed by the
Bose Corporation. While the plaintiff objected to several statements in
the article, the case ultimately turned on only one: the path of the
55. If I am right, the power of the federal courts to render independent judgment
on constitutional law application must be treated as a gloss on the present statutes pre-
scribing appellate jurisdiction. It would be too far afield to discuss the source of the
powers or duties of the state courts, particularly the source of the power, if any, of state
courts to render independent judgment on constitutional law application where the fed-
eral Constitution does not require it.
56. I do not consider here the judicial duty under statutes or rules that enlarge the
scope of appellate review. For example, the ancient practice in equity appeals opened
all questions of law and fact (not resting on credibility) to the independent judgment of
the appellate court. Nor do I consider whether distinctive issues are implicated in appel-
late review of federal statutory claims. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Gover-
nors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
57. An appellate court may also be charged with immediate review of an adminis-
trative determination of constitutional fact when, for example, it is asked to enforce an
agency order. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-20 (1969) (first
amendment objection to labor board order).
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sound heard through the speakers. The article stated that the sound
tended to wander "about the room"; but, sitting without a jury, the
judge found that the sound tended to wander "along the wall" between
the speakers. 58 After concluding that the article contained a false and
disparaging 59 statement of "fact," '60 and that for purposes of this litiga-
tion the Bose Corporation was a public figure, 6' the judge found clear
and convincing proof of actual malice. The crucial conclusion that the
article writer, who had testified extensively, knew at the time of publica-
tion that the offending statement was false rested on a single premise:
the article writer "is an intelligent person whose knowledge of the Eng-
lish language cannot be questioned. It is simply impossible. . . to be-
lieve that he interprets a commonplace word such as 'about' to mean
anything other than its plain, ordinary meaning." 62 The First Circuit
reversed.63 Accepting dubitante that the offending comment was one
of fact rather than opinion,64 the court concluded that Rule 52(a) does
not govern the scope of appellate review of a finding of actual malice. 65
And making its own independent determination, the court found noth-
ing more than the use of "imprecise language."'66
The Supreme Court affirmed, three justices dissenting. The Court
acknowledged both that "[ilt surely does not stretch the language of
[Rule 52(a)] to characterize an inquiry into what a person knew at a
58. See Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1954.
59. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1268 (D.
Mass. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
60. 84 F.R.D. 682, 684 (D. Mass. 1980) (denying motion for summary judgment).
61. 508 F. Supp. at 1271-74. This finding was not challenged on either appeal.
See 104 S. Ct. at 1955 n.8; 692 F.2d 189, 197 (1st Cir. 1982) (Campbell,J., concurring).
62. 508 F. Supp. at 1276-77.
63. 692 F.2d 189.
64. Id. at 194 ("that the statement [in defendant's article] is an opinion is plausi-
ble"). The court noted that "Ithe determination of whether a statement is one of opin-
ion or fact ... is difficult to make and perhaps unreliable as a basis for decision." Id.;
see Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). See generally Note, The
Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a Bright-Line
Rule, 72 Geo. L.J. 1817 (1984) (advocating bright-line rule to reduce uncertainty).
65. 692 F.2d at 195.
66. Id. at 197. The court emphasized the careful preparation and overall accuracy
of defendant's articles, including the one at issue. In so doing, the court focused less on
the actions and knowledge of the article's individual author and more on whether de-
fendant as an organization had adhered to the standards of a "reasonable publisher."
Id. at 196-97 (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
Arguably, the court did not make an independent determination of the evidence, but
instead applied a slightly different standard-that of the "reasonable publisher"-to the
facts found below. This reading is consistent with the court's failure to dispute the trial
court's central finding with respect to actual malice: that the author knew at the time of
publication that certain statements in the article were false. Cf. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1958
(rejecting finding of actual malice on ground that trial court "did not identify any in-
dependent evidence that [the author] realized the inaccuracy of the statement, or enter-
tained serious doubts about its truthfulness, at the time of publication") (footnote
omitted).
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given point in time as a question of 'fact,' ",67 and that Rule 52(a) ap-
plies even to findings of "ultimate facts." 68 But, said the Court, the
Constitution requires judges to exercise independent judgment as to
whether there exists clear and convincing proof of actual malice. 69 The
Court made clear that this requirement is not a special rule for public
figure defamation cases. The Court extensively reviewed precedents
emphasizing the independent judgment rule in a wide variety of speech
contexts, 70 and it repeated Sullivan's insistence that " '[t]his Court's
duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we
must also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain that
those principles have been constitutionally applied.' "71 The three dis-
senting justices insisted that the article writer's actual knowledge was
simply a question of "historical fact" governed by Rule 52(a).72
Bose could be understood not as implicating the constitutional fact
doctrine at all, but as resting instead on the ground that the quantum of
evidence before the district judge was insufficient to permit an infer-
ence about the article writer's intent. 73 But the Supreme Court pro-
67. Id. at 1958 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 1959-60.
69.
The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New York Times
v. Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law. . . . It reflects a deeply held
conviction thatjudges-and particularly members of this Court-must exercise such
review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by
the Constitution. The question whether the evidence in the record in a defa-
mation case is of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First
Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier of fact. Judges, as
expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evi-
dence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars
the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof
of "actual malice."
Id. at 1965 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 1960-65.
71. Id. at 1963-64 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285
(1964)).
72. Id. at 1967 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1968-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(joined by O'Connor, J.). The differences between the Court and the three dissenters
should not be exaggerated. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that in many cases in-
dependent appellate review is constitutionally appropriate. Id. at 1969 n.2. But, quite
plainly, he believed that though this case presented "close questions," id. at 1970, what
the article writer actually knew about his use of language presented a routine issue of
historical fact, resting, as it did, on the article writer's "credibility." Id. at 1969. On its
part, the Court did not deny that appellate judges are bound by findings of historical
fact. Its ultimate conclusion was that
[w]e may accept all of the purely factual findings of the District Court and nev-
ertheless hold as a matter of law that the record does not contain clear and con-
vincing evidence that [the article writer] or his employer prepared the
loudspeaker article with knowledge that it contained a false statement, or with
reckless disregard of the truth.
Id. at 1967 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 1956-58. As the Court understood the record, the district judge had
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ceeded on a quite different conception of what is involved, speaking
repeatedly of the duty of appellate judges to decide independently
whether the facts are sufficient to show that the speech is unprotected.
First amendment law application, as well as first amendment law decla-
ration, is part of the judicial duty. An appellate court cannot content
itself with accepting the results of a "reasonable" application of admit-
tedly correct legal norms to the historical facts. The court's responsi-
bility is to scrutinize the record and marshal the evidence to see if it
yields the characterization put on it by the court below. 74
The Court's justification for its demand of independent appellate
judgment warrants close attention. The Court begins with some back-
ing and filling. First, the distance between independent judgment and
clearly erroneous review is minimized, then acknowledged to be "much
more than a mere matter of degree."'75 Next, we are told that the "vex-
ing nature" of the distinction between law and fact does not "diminish
its [constitutional] importance."'76
These preliminaries put aside, the Court turns to the basis of the
independent judgment rule with respect to actual malice. That review
is required for three reasons:
First, the common law heritage of the [actual malice] rule itself
assigns an especially broad role to the judge in applying it to
specific factual situations. Second, the content of the rule is
not revealed simply by its literal text, but rather is given mean-
ing through the evolutionary process of common law adjudica-
tion; though the source of the rule is found in the Con-
stitution, it is nevertheless largely a judge-made rule of law.
Finally, the constitutional values protected by the rule make it
imperative that judges-and in some cases judges of this
Court-make sure that it is correctly applied. 77
The first two justifications do not drive the opinion. Other difficul-
found only that the statement was mistaken, and then proceeded on the basis of what
"an intelligent person" must have known. Thejudge made no additional relevant find-
ing as to the specific mindset of the writer, and he relied on no other relevant evidence,
Id. at 1958. The Court held that this kind of evidence is insufficient to justify an infer-
ence of malice unless, in the Court's words, " 'the alleged libel purports to be an eyewit-
ness or other direct account of events that speak for themselves.' " Id. at 1966 (quoting Time,
Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 285 (1971)) (emphasis added). So viewed, the Court decided
what we normally consider the equivalent of a question of law, not fact: the quantum of
evidence sufficient to justify, but not require, the drawing of an inference. See Hill,
Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions-The Converse of the Erie Problem?,
17 Ohio St. L.J. 384, 407 & n.143 (1956); supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
74. Cases like Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), that place deferential reli-
ance upon the law application conclusion of the court below, must be taken to be
overruled.
75. 104 S. Ct. at 1959. The Court explains that "the rule of independent review
assigns to judges a constitutional responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of
fact." Id.
76. Id. at 1960.
77. Id.
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ties aside, they would suggest that independent judgment is appropri-
ate only in those first amendment cases where the substantive
constitutional rule has a common law foundation or where the contours
of the rule must be hammered out on a case-by-case basis. But the
importance of having a common law ancestry for a constitutional rule is
never defended and is surely not self-demonstrating. 78 And if empha-
sis is to be placed instead on the necessity for case-by-case adjudication,
independent review would be required for the great bulk of Bill of
Rights claims since the contours of those provisions have been devel-
oped in that manner.79
That the Court is not serious about the first two justifications be-
comes apparent once we examine its elaboration of the third justifica-
tion. In reviewing the wide range of first amendment cases in which the
independent judgment rule has been applied-fighting words, incite-
ment to riot, contempt, obscenity, and child pornography8 -the Court
makes plain the driving impulse of its decision: independent review is
required to protect first amendment values. To my eye, the core of the
opinion is contained in two sentences:
[T]he Court has regularly conducted an independent review of
the record both to be sure that the speech in question actually
falls within the unprotected category and to confine the perim-
eters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow
limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not
be inhibited. Providing triers of fact with a general description
of the type of communication whose content is unworthy of
protection has not, in and of itself, served sufficiently to nar-
row the category, nor served to eliminate the danger that deci-
sions by triers of fact may inhibit the expression of protected
ideas. 8'
The Court's approach has considerable intuitive appeal. It has
long been clear that the substantive constitutional guarantees, particu-
larly the first amendment, have important remedial dimensions.8 2 And,
by fastening the demand for independent judgment to special first
amendment considerations, the Court seemingly bypasses the need to
78. Without explaining its significance for constitutional law, the Court said this
common law rule permitted a large role for the judge. Id. at 1960 & n.20. But see
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 289 (1966)
(emphasizing large role of the English jury in common law criminal libel suits); Presser
& Hurley, Saving God's Republic: The Jurisprudence of Samuel Chase, 1984 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 771, 802-88 (commenting on justice Chase's effort to control juries in public figure
defamation cases).
79. See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 391-95
(1981). In fact, this feature seems to me important for developing a general theory of
constitutional fact review. See infra notes 249-59 and accompanying text.
80. 104 S. Ct. at 1962-63.
81. Id. at 1962 (footnote omitted).
82. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1970).
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face more systemic considerations. As we shall see, however, the
Court's rationale is ultimately unpersuasive.
B. Implications of Bose
Sooner or later, the Supreme Court must confront a range of is-
sues for which its Bose opinion provides little guidance. Quite obvi-
ously, the Court must determine whether Bose's independent judgment
requirement applies to all first amendment claims, 83 and it must also
assess the significance of its reasoning for administrative agencies.
84
More important than Bose's horizontal sweep, however, is its vertical
reach. Bose demands independent judicial judgment on whether speech
is constitutionally protected. But, particularly in defamation cases,
large damage awards pose greater threats to first amendment values
than do findings of liability. 85 There is, accordingly, considerable inter-
est in imposing controls on the amount of recoverable damages, most
generally by eliminating certain items, such as punitive damages, from
any recovery.86 Any such development would be affected by assump-
83. An obscure footnote suggests that commercial speech cases might be treated
differently. 104 S. Ct. at 1961 n.22. Perhaps the "hardy" character of commercial
speech might be thought to obviate the need for the special protection accorded to
speech more easily chilled. See infra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
Even with respect to defamation actions, Bose needs further elaboration. For exam-
ple, the Court makes no mention of its decision in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
(1976), in which it applied a clearly erroneous standard in reviewing a state court jury
determination that a publication was not "factually correct." Id. at 457-59. Firestone did
not involve a public figure, but the first amendment imposes limits on private libel suits
also. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974). See generally Lerman
v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 135-38 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying public figure analy-
sis to author of pornographic novels). Moreover, doubt exists whether the independent
judgment requirement extends to the question whether the statements are in fact defam-
atory. E.g., Church of Scientology v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1984), or at the
summary judgment stage. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1571
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
84. What counts as an historical fact is an important problem in this context. Bose
indicates that inferences drawn from and characterizations put upon primary facts, un-
less based upon witness credibility, are a nondelegable judicial responsibility. Applied
rigorously, this would have a significant impact upon administrative law, for it would
mean that courts should refuse the normally accorded deference to the inference-draw-
ing capacities of "expert" agencies. On the meaning of deference generally, see
Monaghan, supra note 6, at 4-5. Under this view, for example, a court could not defer
to the labor board's conclusion that certain employer speech is constitutionally unpro-
tected because "coercive." Statements that "a reviewing court must recognize the
Board's competence in the first instance to judge the impact [of the speech] in the con-
text of the employer-employee relationship," NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,
619-20 (1969), could not be understood to compel real deference to the board's view
that the speech is unprotected. At most, the board's conclusion would act simply as a
caution to the reviewing court.
85. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996-97 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane)
(Bork, J., concurring).
86. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the
[Vol. 85:229
CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW
tions about whether Bose's independent judgment requirement applies
to the award of damages, as well as to the determination of liability in
first amendment cases. 87
In addition, the Supreme Court must determine the contours of
the "duty" of independent review. Initially, the Court must decide
whether both parties, or only the free speech claimant, can demand in-
dependent appellate review; that is, can the party opposing the free
speech claim demand independent appellate judgment on the first
amendment law application point?"" Suppose, for example, that in Bose
the judge had found that there was no clear and convincing proof of
actual knowledge or recklessness. Could Bose Corporation, the party
opposing the first amendment defense, insist upon independent appel-
late review? That possibility is left open by the Court's ultimate hold-
ing in Bose, where it frames its conclusion "as a matter of law" on the
historical facts found by the district judge,89 and by Connick v. Mllyers,90
in which, in reversing a finding in favor of the free speech claimant, the
Court stated that the question whether the speech was protected or not
presented a question of law.9 ' The rationale used to explain whether
the party opposing the free speech claim is also entitled to independent
judgment will have considerable importance in understanding the in-
dependent judgment rule, both in the first amendment context and
elsewhere. The cases reflect a special judicial concern that the claim of
federal right not be incorrectly denied. But if labeling something a ques-
tion of constitutional fact guarantees that it will be treated like a ques-
tion of law, then either party is entitled to independent appellate
review. In Bose itself, the Supreme Court reviewed de novo the conclu-
Press-An Extended Comment on "The Anderson Solution," 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
793 (1984).
87. It can readily be argued, to paraphrase Bose, that "[p]roviding triers of fact with
a general description of the type of [damages] has not, in and of itself, served sufficiently
... to eliminate the danger that decisions by triers of fact [on damages] may inhibit the
expression of protected ideas." 104 S. Ct. at 1962. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745
F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984), impliedly assumes that Bose is not applicable to "megaverdicts,"
id. at 141, and that the standard of review is whether the award "shocks [the] con-
science" of the court. Id. at 141-42. Whether Bose can be sensibly applied to the dam-
age issue, which seems to me doubtful, is not within the scope of this Article.
88. I do not intend here to open up the large question of whether the speaker or
the public, or both, possess the substantive right. This would require examination of
the foundation of such decisions as First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978),
of the distinction between rights held personally and rights held as a representative of
the public, see L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 525-28, and of third party standing. See
Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 277 (1984).
89. 104 S. Ct. at 1967.
90. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
91. Id. at 148 n.7, 150 n.10; see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 513
(1951) (plurality opinion) ("When facts are found that establish the violation of a stat-
ute, the protection against conviction afforded by the First Amendment is a matter of
law.").
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sion of a court of appeals that had sustained, not denied, the federal
claim.
How the duty concept is to be understood is also unclear. Bose
stresses the rhetoric of obligation; indeed, the duty of independent
judgment is said to lie "particularly [upon] members of this Court." 92
Quite plainly, judicial authority to make an independent judgment on
constitutional law application is one thing-a judicial duty to do so,
quite another. The effort to locate the duty in the first amendment is
troublesome given the general rule that there is no constitutional right
to appellate review in any civil case. 93 Is there a special requirement of
some appellate review in first amendment cases?94 If so, does that re-
quirement extend to the Supreme Court itself? Given the "deeply held
conviction that judges-and particularly members of this Court-must
exercise [independent] review," 95 can the Court properly deny peti-
tions for review in first amendment cases where the sole issue is
whether, on the evidence, the free speech claim has been correctly re-
jected? May the Court properly limit its grant of review to whether
correct first amendment standards have been employed, leaving the
"routine" law application point for final disposition in the court be-
low? 96 Or is the only point of Bose that if an appellate court turns to the
law application issue, then must it render its own independent
judgment?
In considering the nature of the appellate "duty" stressed by Bose,
one should bear in mind not only its potentially burdensome character,
particularly for a tribunal with the wide-ranging responsibilities of the
Supreme Court, but also the evident strain that constitutional fact re-
view often places on the Court's institutional capacity. Cox v. Louisi-
ana97 illustrates both problems. In Cox, the Court sustained a first
92. 104 S. Ct. at 1965.
93. In re Burley, 738 F.2d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 1984). Indeed, the same rule formally
applies in criminal cases. See Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. 830, 839 (1985); Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974). This difficulty is not plausibly escaped by arguing that clearly
erroneous review in first amendment cases is an unconstitutional condition on the statu-
torily conferred right to appeal. See generally Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293 (1984) (review-
ing materials on unconstitutional conditions).
94. National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977), seems
animated by that assumption.
95. 104 S. Ct. at 1965.
96. Similar questions exist at the state court level. Like the Supreme Court, many
state supreme courts have discretionary review over intermediate appeals courts. After
Bose, may such a court refuse review, or grant review on a limited basis? The issue is not
raised squarely if the decision below is in favor of the free speech claimant, or if it rests
upon some ground independent of the first amendment claim.
On the question whether either Congress or the states can so structure theirjudicial
systems that constitutional issues must be raised in only certain courts, see Monaghan,
supra note 6, at 19-20.
97. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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amendment defense to a breach of the peace conviction, but reversal of
the state supreme court on this point was possible only because the
Court undertook an extensive independent inquiry into a very detailed
record.98 In the process, the Court rejected not only the state supreme
court's plausible characterization of the evidentiary facts, but also the
trial court's "feel" for what the evidence amounted to.99
II. THE ORIGINS AND VAGARIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW
Thus far, this Article has treated independent appellate review in
first amendment cases as a particular application of the constitutional
fact doctrine. But in origin and line of development, constitutional fact
review is far removed from appellate review in first amendment cases.
Although the evolution of the constitutional fact doctrine has been any-
thing but straightforward, a brief examination makes apparent the gen-
eral utility of distinguishing between two quite different contexts of
constitutional fact review: judicial control of the administrative state
and appellate review of the decisions of inferior tribunals.
A. Judicial Control of the Administrative State
Article III could have been read to require that Congress assign all
the federal adjudicatory business specified therein to some court,
whether an article III court or a state court.10 0 The Supreme Court has
never embraced such a position, however.' 0 ' Most important for our
purposes, nineteenth century decisions established that "public
rights"-largely claims by private individuals against the government
for such matters as pensions and land patents, claims to which the gov-
ernment could entirely refuse consent to suitl 0 2-might, if Congress so
98. See, e.g., id. at 541-43 nn.2-6, 546-49 nn.9-1 1. The Court emphasized the
duty language, saying that "[b]ecause a claim of constitutionally protected right is in-
volved, it 'remains our duty in a case such as this to make an independent examination
of the whole record.' " Id. at 545 n.8 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
235 (1963)).
99. Id. at 544-51. For another example, see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886 (1982) (record does not support Mississippi Supreme Court's finding that
boycott was illegal or that petitioners were liable for all resulting damages). Similarly, in
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), the Court made its own independent determi-
nation that the movie Carnal Knowledge was not "patently offensive," id. at 161, despite
the contrary finding of the state courtjury and the state courts. Id. at 160.
100. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
92-93 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
101. The adjudicatory authority of territorial and military courts, as well as other
tribunals, was quickly upheld. See Currie, BankruptcyJudges and the Independent Judi-
ciary, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 441, 447-49 (1983).
102. The category of public rights has never been entirely stable. It has included
some claims by the government against private parties for such matters as custom du-
ties. See, e.g., Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929). But whether jurisdiction
over government claims against private parties for taxes can be conferred exclusively on
a non-article III tribunal has not yet been resolved. See Hart, The Power of Congress to
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chose, be left entirely to final administrative determination.' 0 3 But
these exceptions were not understood to have wide significance, and
the deeply held assumption was that the regular courts must remain
freely available to adjudicate all other disputes, both in suits by the gov-
ernment and between private parties. 10 4
In time, however, the imperatives of the administrative state utterly
destroyed this assumption as a working principle of government, for
effective regulation presupposed a much larger role for administrative
adjudication than that allowed by the nineteenth century conceptions
of public rights. The story is too well known to justify retelling here.
Suffice it to say that by the time of Crowell v. Benson,' 0 5 a fundamental
transformation in American law had occurred. The Constitution's
"preference" for adjudication of disputes by the regular courts had in
large part collapsed. In Crowell, the Supreme Court recognized that it
was too late to cut back significantly on the adjudicatory apparatus of
the modern administrative state. Crowell not only reconfirmed the pub-
lic rights cases, it expressly sanctioned, subject to limited judicial re-
view, administrative adjudication of the duty of one private person to
another arising from government regulatory programs. In recognizing
a wide area for the operation of public administration, Crowell removed
both article III and the due process clause as meaningful barriers to the
use of administrative agencies to establish and enforce, at least initially,
all of the rights and duties created by the emerging administrative
state.'06
But focusing on the "normal" pattern of administrative adjudica-
tion that characterizes the present era does not tell the whole story.
Traditionally, judges have assumed that they were ordained by the
Constitution to demark legitimate claims of public administration from
illegitimate interferences with private rights. This judicial task was
thought to include not only enforcing the substantive constitutional
guarantees, but also setting some limits to the kinds of controversies
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev.
1362, 1369-70 & n.32 (1953). See generally Monaghan, supra note 6, at 14-20 (discuss-
ing public rights).
103. The public rights distinction took hold in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
104. Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 912-24 (1930), reflects
this premise. For a modern restatement of this view, see Currie, supra note 101, at
452-53.
105. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
106. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982),
does not impair this important legacy of Crowell. See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 18-20.
Professor Currie apparently agrees. He laments that the Court's redefinition of public
rights to embrace all federal statutory rights confirms a wide area of adjudication free
from the article III requirements that he believes the framers envisioned. See Currie,
supra note 101, at 463-64; see also Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies,
and The Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 Duke Lo . 197 (criticizing the logic of the dis-
tinction between public and private rights in any form).
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that could be resolved by the rapidly growing number of administrative
agencies. While slowly yielding "ordinary" factfinding and law applica-
tion to administrative agencies, judges increasingly resorted to consti-
tutional fact review as a means of structuring the "appropriate"
allocation of functions between agency and court. 10 7
Constitutional fact review had its antecedents in the doctrine of
jurisdictional fact, which the English superior courts, particularly
King's Bench, developed to confine administrative agencies and infer-
ior courts within their delegated authority.' 08 The jurisdictional fact
concept emerged as a construct for partitioning functions between
agencies and the superintending courts:' 0 9 "ordinary facts" could be
left for final administrative determination, but the superior courts
would render independent judgment upon those "facts" governing the
agency's "jurisdiction."'"10 And though the distinction between ordi-
nary and jurisdictional fact was not, and could not be, expressed with
logical precision, it was not on that account empty. Its basis seems to
have been intuitive and functional, a device employed to permit judicial
control of administrative action to prevent what, in terms of the statu-
tory scheme under review, would be viewed as an important error. I1 '
107. See Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept of Administrative-
Constitutional Law, 69 W. Va. L. Rev. 249, 261, 271 (1967).
108. This discussion draws upon the lucid analysis of ProfessorJaffe, and I see no
need to repeat that here. See L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 624-33.
109. See, e.g., Groenwelt v. Burwell, 1 Salk. 144, 91 Eng. Rep. 134 (K.B. 1700);
Rex v. Inhabitants of Glamorganshire, 1 Ld. Ray. 580, 88 Eng. Rep. 1409 (K.B. 1691)
(certiorari would issue from King's Bench to all inferior jurisdictions "to see that they
keep themselves within their jurisdiction; and if they exceed it, to restrain them").
110. "The practical result of the doctrine of 'jurisdictional fact' is to throw open for
re-examination in court facts which, if they were not held to be 'jurisdictional,' would be
concluded either by the decision of the administrative body or at least by the evidence at
its disposal." Dickinson, supra note 16, at 1060 (citation omitted). Indeed, where nec-
essary the English courts showed a tendency to take evidence and make their own find-
ings on jurisdictional facts, L.Jaffe, supra note 17, at 628-29, and this was the scope of
jurisdictional fact review adopted in the American courts. See id. at 633. Emphasizing
cases that reviewed administrative determinations by certiorari, however, Professor
Dickinson argues that the jurisdictional fact doctrine only rarely resulted in independent
judicial factfinding. Moreover, he asserts that most courts applying the doctrine de-
clined even to exercise independent judgment on the administrative record, accepting
instead the existence of the jurisdictional fact if it could have been found by "reasonable
men on the evidence presented in the administrative proceeding." Dickinson, supra
note 16, at 1067.
Arguably, Professor Dickinson takes too narrow an historical view of the jurisdic-
tional fact doctrine by focusing on only the certiorari cases, in which the scope of appel-
late review was limited by the special requirements of the writ. And in any case, the
distance between Professor Dickinson and Professor Jaffe should not be overstated.
Both agreed that the jurisdictional fact doctrine assumed that courts were competent in all
cases to exercise whatever scope of review was necessary to ensure that agency action
was not ultra vires, yet neither believed that the doctrine imposed a duty on courts to
exercise a given level of review in any particular case.
111. See L.Jaffe, supra note 17, at 631-33. Professor Dickinson rightly emphasizes
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American courts early on embraced the jurisdictional fact doctrine.
But not until the emergence of the administrative state did an impor-
tant difference from the English practice develop: courts insisted that
the Constitution itself required some form of the doctrine. 12 This de-
velopment began with Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Minne-
sota, 1 3 the first Supreme Court decision applying the due process
clause to restrict the states. Invoking the "wisdom of successive
ages," ' 1 4 the Court held that the due process clause requires judicial
review of a claim that administratively prescribed rates are confisca-
tory. 1 5 The Court said that the "question of the reasonableness of a
rate of charge for transportation by a railroad company, involving as it
does the element of reasonableness both as regards the company and
as regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial
investigation."'1 16
The Supreme Court did not squarely address the scope of the
that, in principle, the issue presented by the jurisdictional fact doctrine was at one level
simply a question of statutory construction.
If the legislature desires and intends to make the validity of an administrative
determination turn on whether or not the existence of a particular fact shall be
later proved to the satisfaction of a court, the court must give effect to the
legislative intent and determine for itself in the review proceeding the existence
of the fact.
Dickinson, supra note 16, at 1063. But, as Professor Dickinson acknowledges, thejuris-
dictional fact doctrine also reflected a general approach by courts to the control of ad-
ministrative conduct, both in England and in the United States. Id. at 1064-67; see also
L.Jaffe, supra note 17, at 634 ("The concept ofjurisdictional fact was devised originally
by English and American courts to justify a fairly limited judicial review of orders other-
wise immune.").
112.
The doctrine of constitutional fact. . . applies to constitutional limitations on
administrative jurisdiction the same reasoning which the doctrine ofjurisdic-
tional fact applies to statutory limitations. Just as a statute may confine jurisdic-
tion to cases where a certain fact exists, so the constitution may be construed to
limit jurisdiction to the presence or absence of a fact-situation.
Dickinson, supra note 16, at 1067; see also id. at 1072 ("The doctrine of constitutional
fact is the doctrine of jurisdictional fact in special form.").
113. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
114. Id. at 457.
115. Id. at 458. This result was reached despite the general principle that the fed-
eral Constitution does not mandate separation of powers at the state level. Dreyer v.
Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1907). This principle has, of course, suffered considerable
erosion. See Monaghan, supra note 82, at 524 n.23.
116. 134 U.S. at 458. The Court was unclear whether this "judicial investigation"
would require de novo proceedings. The state supreme court had construed the statute
at issue to provide that rates promulgated by the agency were "final and conclusive as to
what are equal and reasonable charges." Id. at 456. Given this construction, the Court
simply may have viewed the issue as whether a "question of law"-what are "equal and
reasonable" charges-had been impermissibly removed from judicial determination.
On the other hand, the Court did indicate a separate concern over the fairness of the
administrative proceedings, both in terms of the statute on its face and as applied. Id. at
457-58.
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"question for judicial investigation" identified in Chicago, Milwaukee &
St. Paul Railway until Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,117 an-
other confiscation challenge to a state public utility rate order. In a cur-
sory opinion by Justice McReynolds, the Court said:
[I]f the owner claims confiscation of his property will result,
the State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that
issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own
independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise
the order is void because in conflict with the due process
clause .... 118
More important, the Court assumed that the judicial task did not simply
embrace judicial application of the constitutional norm of a "fair re-
turn" to the administratively found facts. The crucial issue dividing the
litigants was the value of the utility's property, and on that issue the
Court required independent judicial judgment."19 Nonetheless, the
case should not be overstated. Ben Avon does not address the scope of
Supreme Court review over state courts. Indeed, at the time the limita-
tions of review by writ of error greatly restricted that power. 120 Nor
does Ben Avon address the issue of scope of review by higher state
courts over inferior courts. 12 1 The only point decided in the case was
117. 253 U.S. 287 (1920). It should be noted, however, that a strong dictum by
Justice Holmes prefigured the Ben Avon result. In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211
U.S. 210 (1908), a challenge to a state rate order, Justice Holmes declared:
Whether [the railroads'] property was taken unconstitutionally depends upon
the valuation of the property, the income to be derived from the proposed rate
and the proportion between the two-pure matters of fact. . . . They are not
to be forbidden to try those facts before a court of their own choosing if other-
wise competent.
Id. at 228; see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 147 (1908) ("If the law be such as to
make the decision of the legislature or of a commission conclusive as to the sufficiency of
the rates, this court has held such a law to be unconstitutional."). See generally
Buchanan, The Ohio Valley Water Company Case and the Valuation of Railroads, 40
Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1040 (1927) ("[I]t would be an error to suppose that [Ben Avon] was
inconsistent with any of the earlier authorities.").
118. 253 U.S. at 289.
119. The Court reversed the ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which had
denied the lower state court's power to arrive at an independent determination of the
value of the utility's property. See Borough of Ben Avon v. Ohio Valley Water Co. (No.
2), 260 Pa. 310, 103 A. 750 (1918).
120. This point was stressed in the dissenting opinion ofJustice Brandeis. Because
of the limitations on the writ of error, he denied that the undervaluation issue was prop-
erly a basis for complaint before the Supreme Court. See 253 U.S. at 298; cf. Hill, The
Inadequate State Ground, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 946 n.18 (1965) ("[T]he Court has
been thought to be unduly influenced by the earlier limitation on the scope of review of
state judgments.").
121. Indeed, on remand the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ben Avon did
not require that it exercise independent judgment on the lower state court's determina-
tion of the value of the utility's property, and it affirmed on a "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard. See Borough of Ben Avon v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 271 Pa. 346, 350, 114 A.
369, 370-71 (1921).
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that the independent judgment of some state judicial tribunal must be
provided on the "value" component of a confiscation claim.
Ben Avon need not have spawned constitutional fact review outside
of the rate setting context. The case was decided against two closely
related background premises: first, that a legislature could set rates so
long as some court was available to hear claims that the rates were con-
fiscatory;' 22 and second, that no legislature could insulate its actions
from judicial review by determining initially the facts upon which the
constitutionality of those actions depended and thereafter making such
factual findings binding upon the courts.1 23 Once the Ben Avon Court
had concluded that the state agency had performed a "legislative" act
in setting the challenged rates,' 24 it seemed axiomatic that the agency's
findings of constitutional fact must be subject to the same level of re-
view that would apply to similar findings made by a legislature.125 We
need not stop to examine all the difficulties in the Court's reasoning.126
122. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
123. See Bikl6, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitu-
tional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 6, 19 (1924); supra note 117. With
the rise of as-applied review, which occurred at roughly the same time as the emergence
of the administrative state, the "facts" on which constitutionality depended began to
include the specific facts relating to the application of the statute in question. See Dick-
inson, supra note 16, at 1067-72.
124. The Court was unanimous on this point, see 253 U.S. at 289; id. at 293 (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting), relying largely on its earlier decision in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1908) (state agency regulating corporations, though a court for
some purposes, performs "legislative" function when setting rates). Tracing the rise of
agency involvement in rate setting, Dean Landis observes that
by the turn of the century, [rate setting] appeared to be more of a legislative
power than ajudicial power. The administrative was seen as taking the place of
the legislature so that its functioning was easier to analogize to the exercise of
power by the legislative branch of government than by the judicial branch.
J. Landis, The Administrative Process 126 (1938).
It was apparent from the outset, however, that rate setting was not always comforta-
bly analogized to legislation. At some stages of the process, the agency functioned like a
court. See, e.g., ICC v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913) (where agency hears
complaint that rates for a single carrier are unreasonable, proceeding is "quasi-judicial"
and must afford trial-type protections). Confusion over the proper characterization of
rate setting persists even today. Compare United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410
U.S. 224, 243-46 (1973) (where agency rate order applied prospectively to all railroads
within agency's jurisdiction, agency engaged in "rulemaking"), with id. at 253-54
(Douglas,J., dissenting) (where agency bases rates on evidentiary facts, agency engaged
in "adjudication"). See generally Friendly, supra note 16, at 1305-10 (criticizing Florida
East Coast majority).
125. See Ben Avon, 253 U.S. at 289; Larson, supra note 17, at 211. Counsel for the
Ohio Water Company were careful to present the Court with this syllogism in order to
fit their case within the accepted precedents. See Buchanan, supra note 117, at 1037.
126. The Court's analogy to legislative action is troublesome. It seems likely that
agency action of the type present in Ben Avon-setting rates for a single utility after an
evidentiary hearing-would today be assimilated to adjudication, not legislation, See
supra note 124. But even granting the Court its characterization of the issue, a further
problem remains. Legislative action has traditionally enjoyed a presumption of constitu-
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It is enough to note that Ben Avon's independent judgment rule could
have been limited to cases in which the agency was performing what
were then understood as "legislative" functions.
That the Supreme Court would not view constitutional fact review
so narrowly became quickly apparent. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 127 decided
only two years after Ben Avon, sanctioned constitutional fact review in
the context of what was clearly "adjudicative" action by an administra-
tive agency. At issue were habeas challenges to administrative deporta-
tion warrants. Petitioners insisted that their deportation was improper
because they were United States citizens. Administrative rejection of
petitioners' claims was not conclusive on the courts, said Justice Bran-
deis, because citizenship is "an essential jurisdictional fact."1 28 Depor-
tation works an obvious and grievous loss of liberty, and "[a]gainst the
danger of such deprivation without the sanction afforded by judicial
proceedings," the due process clause "affords protection."' 129 This,
the Court insisted, was not novel doctrine. "The difference in security
of judicial over administrative action has been adverted to by this
court."' 130 Once again, however, the thrust of the opinion was a re-
quirement of independent judgment by some-but not all-courts.
In Crowell v. Benson, 13 1 a divided Court both confirmed and genera-
lized the constitutional fact doctrine in strong terms. While conceding
that ordinary facts could be established in the administrative process,
the Court held that constitutional facts must be found by the courts.
Thus, an employer challenging a federal administrative compensation
order was entitled to an independent judicial determination of whether
the injury occurred on navigable waters, as well as of the existence of
the employer-employee relationship. These conditions were consid-
ered indispensable to the application of the statute "not only because
tionality; legislative findings are upheld if "reasonable." See Radice v. New York, 264
U.S. 292, 294 (1924); Bikl6, supra note 123, at 21. Yet the Ben Avon Court made no
effort to explain why this same presumption should not also attach to agency actions that
were assertedly "legislative." Cf.J. Dickinson, supra note 24, at 199 ("Surely the formal
conclusions of fact reached by an administrative tribunal after a hearing and the taking
of testimony should be entitled to as much respect as findings of fact supposed to have
been made by a legislative body as the implied basis for its enactments."). That the
Court felt no need to defend this point may have reflected its internalization of the
ongoing assault-in the name of "substantive" due process-on the supremacy of legis-
lative findings in areas of economic regulation.
127. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
128. Id. at 284. Contra United States v.Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (Department
of Labor determination on question of citizenship is final). Professor Larson has ob-
served the crucial influence that the development of as-applied review had in generating
the contrary holdings in these two cases. See Larson, supra note 17, at 198 n.54.
129. 259 U.S. at 284-85.
130. Id. at 285; see, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (admin-
istrative agency may not impose criminal punishment on a deportable alien); Brown,
Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 261, 293-95
(1935).
131. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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the Congress has so provided explicitly. . . but also because the power
of the Congress to enact the legislation turns upon the existence of
these conditions."' 132 The ground was article III, not due process:
In relation to these basic facts, the question is not the ordinary
one as to the propriety of provision for administrative deter-
minations. . . . It is rather a question of the appropriate maintenance
of the Federal judicial power in requiring the observance of constitu-
tional restrictions. It is the question whether the Congress may
substitute for constitutional courts, in which the judicial power
of the United States is vested, an administrative agency-in
this instance a single deputy commissioner-for the final de-
termination of the existence of the facts upon which the en-
forcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend. 133
In an elaborate dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis argued that article
III provided no support for a constitutional fact doctrine, 13 4 although
he acknowledged that on occasion the due process clause would re-
quire judicial process. 135
B. Independent Record
While this Article focuses on constitutional fact review in the
Supreme Court, it would be radically incomplete if it did not notice
another aspect of constitutional fact review: the independent record
requirement. In Crowell, Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion states:
The primary question for consideration is not whether Con-
gress provided, or validly could provide, that determinations
of fact by the deputy commissioner should be conclusive upon
the district court. The question is: Upon what record shall the
district court's review of the order of the deputy commissioner
be based? The courts below held that the respondent was en-
titled to a trial de novo; that all the evidence introduced before
the deputy commissioner should go for naught; and that re-
spondent should have the privilege of presenting new, and
even entirely different, evidence in the district court. Unless
that holding was correct the judgment below obviously cannot
132. Id. at 55.
133. Id. at 56 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Court added:
The recognition of the utility and convenience of administrative agencies for
the investigation and finding of facts within their proper province, and the sup-
port of their authorized action, does not require the conclusion that there is no
limitation of their use, and that the Congress could completely oust the courts
of all determinations of fact by vesting the authority to make them with finality
in its own instrumentalities or in the Executive Department. That would be to
sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to estab-
lish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever
fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts,
and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law.
Id. at 56-57.
134. Id. at 84-88 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Monaghan, supra note 6, at 19.
254 [Vol. 85:229
CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW
be affirmed.13 6
It seemed evident that if the employer had a right to an independ-
ent judicial record, independent judicial judgment followed as a matter
of course. With the single exception of Ng Fung Ho, however, no deci-
sion had yet held that the Constitution required more than an in-
dependent judicial judgment on the administrative record.' 37
Nonetheless, in Crowell the Court endorsed the broader version of the
constitutional fact doctrine:
Assuming that the Federal court may determine for itself the
existence of these fundamental or jurisdictional facts, we come
to the question,-Upon what record is the determination to be
made? . . .We think that the essential independence of the
exercise of the judicial power of the United States in the en-
forcement of constitutional rights requires that the Federal
court should determine such an issue upon its own record and
the facts elicited before it.138
This statement comes late in the opinion, and the Court's way of
putting the point is unsatisfying. The Court said that an independent
record requirement is necessary in order to maintain "the essential in-
dependence of the exercise of the judicial power,"13 9 a formulation
that suggests that article III is not concerned with the personal rights of
litigants, but with the institutional independence of the federal adjudi-
catory process.' 40 On this reasoning, it seems that an independent rec-
ord is only an adjunct to the more basic requirement of independent
judicial judgment, and thus that this procedural safeguard is unneces-
sary where there is a trial-type administrative proceeding resulting in a
formal record. 141
In any event, it soon became apparent that effective regulation pre-
supposed that the agency be permitted to construct the record, even
with respect to constitutional facts.142 This development was made
136. 285 U.S. at 66.
137. Dickinson, supra note 16, at 1072-73. Indeed, Ben Avon had assumed that a
reviewing court could proceed on the basis of an administrative record. See Ohio Valley
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 287 (1920); see also United States v.Ju
Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (no right to judicial trial de novo to challenge an administra-
tive exclusion order even on the claim of citizenship).
138. 285 U.S. at 63-64.
139. Id. at 64.
140. Commentators are divided on whether article III should be understood to
confer personal rights. See Note, Federal Magistrates and the Principles of Article III,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 1947, 1952-53 (1984).
141. See Strong, supra note 107, at 275. Of course, many lawyers would insist that
who finds the facts is far more important than who applies the law, and at least a plural-
ity of the present Court endorses that view. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84-86 (1982) (plurality opinion).
142. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 20, 47 (1937) (re-
jecting respondent's Crowell-based independent record challenge); Strong, supra note
17, at 230-40. See generally Dickinson, supra note 16, at 1061-63, 1077-82 (predicting
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possible a few years after Crowell. In St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 143 the Court, while reaffirming the independent judgment rule in
ratesetting cases, broadly retreated from an independent judicial rec-
ord requirement. ChiefJustice Hughes, Crowell's author, wrote:
But this judicial duty to exercise an independent judgment
does not require or justify disregard of the weight which may
properly attach to findings upon hearing and evidence. On
the contrary, the judicial duty is performed in the light of the
proceedings already had and may be greatly facilitated by the
assembling and analysis of the facts in the course of the legis-
lative determination. Judicial judgment may be none the less
appropriately independent because informed and aided by the
sifting procedure of an expert legislative agency. 144
The ChiefJustice added that" 'in ordinary cases, and where the oppor-
tunity is open,' all the pertinent evidence should be submitted in the
first instance to the Commission."' 145 Indeed, it would take a "clear
case" for the Court to consider evidence not presented to the
agency. 146 After St. Joseph Stock Yards the independent record require-
ment receded into the constitutional shadows. 147
However, in light of the Court's recent decision in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 148 it is certain that we shall see
renewed interest in the independent record requirement. In Northern
Pipeline, a divided Court held that article III courts, not legislative
courts or administrative agencies, mustfind the underlying facts in com-
mon law disputes governed by state law. According to Justice Bren-
nan's plurality opinion, only those "public rights" created by statute
may be committed to non-article III tribunals. 149
The potential for the resurrection of some form of the independ-
ent record requirement is easily illustrated. Suppose, for example, that
a student is expelled from a state university following a fairly held disci-
that requirement of trial de novo would become altogether disruptive of administrative
processes).
143. 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
144. Id. at 53.
145. Id. at 54 (quoting Manufacturers Ry. v. United States, 246 U.S. 457, 489
(1918)).
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 321
(1953); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 47 (1937).
148. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
149. See id. at 81 (limiting non-article III adjudication to "congressionally created
statutory rights"). This may expand, as well as curtail, the reach of the public rights
category. See supra note 106. WhetherJustice Brennan also attempted to distinguish
between adjudication by agencies and by legislative courts is unclear. On whether such
a distinction is tenable, compare Currie, supra note 101, at 456 & n.85 (recognizing
distinction where separate administrative agency employs distinctive nonjudicial proce-
dures and lacks power to enforce its own decisions), with Note, supra note 140, at 1957
n.50 (distinction between adjudication by agencies and courts "may be more theoretical
than real").
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plinary proceeding that found he had engaged in unprotected miscon-
duct. In his reinstatement action in a district court, Bose-wholly apart
from Crowell-would require independent judicial judgment on law ap-
plication. But suppose the student contends that the administrative
finding of misconduct is false and that he was expelled because of pro-
tected speech activities. What is the court obligated to do? For some,
like Professor Hart, article III is not at all implicated: the district court
is not being asked to enforce an administrative order, but simply to
intervene to correct administrative wrongdoing. 50 Even if we make
that assumption, does the student have a constitutional right to review
under either the due process clause 51 or the first amendment? 52 It is
unlikely that the Court will directly address this question because sec-
tion 1983153 appears to authorize such actions.' 54 But does that statute
also determine the scope of judicial review? Does section 1983, the
first amendment, or article III require an independent judicial record,
so that the administrative proceeding is effectively treated as a
nullity? 155
In its modern form, Crowell v. Benson suggests that, at most, in-
dependent judgment is all that is constitutionally required in the above
situation.15 ° Indeed, in United States v. Raddatz,157 citing Crowell, the
Court held that an article III judge could accept a magistrate's factual
findings on a motion to exclude evidence allegedly obtained in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment.' 58 But Raddatz might be distinguished
on the ground that the exclusionary rule is not part of the fourth
amendment right, but simply a judicially fashioned remedy that a liti-
150. It is possible to posit a distinction between courts asked to enforce legal duties
and those asked merely to set aside administrative decisions that, standing alone, would
not serve as the predicate for further judicial action. See Hart, supra note 102, at
1375-78. I have elaborated upon and criticized that distinction, see Monaghan, supra
note 6, at 20-24, but my criticism need not be accepted for the purposes of this Article.
It is, in fact, by no means clear that Hart would apply the enforcement/nonenforcement
court distinction to constitutional cases if the litigant could demonstrate a right to re-
view. Id. at 11 n.62.
151. ProfessorJaffe argues that due process requires judicial review of any coercive
administrative action. L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 384-89. But there remains a large
question as to what counts as "coercion."
152. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), would not be dispositive in this
case because the university's substantive rule-permitting expulsion of disruptive stu-
dents-is not a content-based restriction.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
154. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1972).
155. Cf. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1091 (8th Cir. 1969)
(Lay, J., dissenting) ("A civil rights action under § 1983 is a separate proceeding which
requires a trial de novo .... [A] district judge is not bound by ... prior findings of
fact of any state official.").
156. Unless, of course, one reads article III as does Professor Hart. See supra note
150.
157. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
158. Id. at 676.
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gant is permitted to assert.15 9 Moreover, Northern Pipeline suggests that
a broad reconsideration is in order. The plurality not only opined that
rights not created by Congress may require more intensive judicial
factfinding,' 60 it also emphasized the importance of judicial factfinding
on any view of the purposes of article 111.161 And surely it is difficult to
believe that article III requires independent judicial factfinding in di-
versity cases, but only independent judgment on an administrative rec-
ord when constitutional rights are at stake. Yet an affirmative
requirement ofjudicial factfinding grounded on either article III or the
first amendment has startling implications. Any such general require-
ment seems inconsistent with the practical exigencies of the administra-
tive state. For example, no one yet supposes that the first amendment
guarantees independent factfinding by a court when the NLRB has
found that an employer has engaged in unprotected "coercive"
speech.' 6 2
At this point in our history I would be startled to see the Court
decide that a litigant pressing a bona fide constitutional claim could be
denied access to the independent judgment of a judicial forum.' 63
Nevertheless, I confess considerable uncertainty over whether the Con-
stitution generally mandates any specific level of independent judicial
factfinding. My inclination is to start with Justice Brandeis' attempt in
both Crowell and St. Joseph Stock Yards to reformulate the substance of
the constitutional fact doctrine. Justice Brandeis asserted that due pro-
cess sometimes requires judicial process. In this respect, he urged a
.sharp distinction between claims of "liberty" and of "property."1 64 In
these terms the analysis is troublesome. The general distinction pos-
ited between liberty and property has not weathered well in other areas
of law, partly in recognition that the Constitution does not appear to
159. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984), strongly emphasizes this
rationale.
160.
[W]hile Crowell ... endorsed the proposition that Congress possesses broad
discretion to assign factfinding functions ... to aid in the adjudication of con-
gressionally created statutory rights, Crowell does not support the further prop-
osition ... that Congress possesses the same degree of discretion in assigning
traditionally judicial power to adjuncts engaged in the adjudication of rights not
created by Congress.
458 U.S. at 81-82. Raddatz and Northern Pipeline are hard to reconcile in terms of their
general approach. See Currie, supra note 101, at 458-59; Note, supra note 140, at 1957
n.49.
161. See 458 U.S. at 84-86.
162. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 619-20 (1969). But Bose
seems to foreclose deferential review of constitutional facts in the first amendment con-
text. See supra note 84
163. The Court has been assiduous in reading statutes that preclude judicial review
as not cutting off review of constitutional claims. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361, 366-74 (1974).
164. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 50, 87-88 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); L.
Jaffe, supra note 17, at 385-89.
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grade in such a general way the rights that it confers. 16 5
But Justice Brandeis' analysis rests on a deeper ground. By radi-
cally separating due process from article III, he acknowledged that the
very existence of the process of administrative adjudication could no
longer be considered irreconcilably at variance with the purposes of
having article III courts. 166 In thus breaking due process concerns free
from article III's gravitational pull, Justice Brandeis offered the possi-
bility of a unified framework-one that is equally applicable to federal
and state courts-governing the extent to which the Constitution allo-
cates functions between courts and agencies. And, at least in its mod-
ern form, due process theory permits a discriminating judicial response
to the problems of administrative adjudication, 67 a response that re-
flects the specific substantive constitutional values at stake rather than
generalized notions about the nature of federal judicial power. 16 8
C. Independent Appellate Judgment
Crowell's constitutional fact doctrine elicited considerable academic
commentary, mostly hostile. Some commentators insisted that the in-
dependent judgment rule had been quickly and quietly discarded, even
in the rate cases.' 6 9 The more common academic response was to criti-
165. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
166. Justice Brandeis' analysis failed to acknowledge the historically close connec-
tion between article III and due process- a connection apparent not only in Crowell
itself, see L.Jaffe, supra note 17, at 639, but even more so in the cases that preceded it.
See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 17.
167. Justice Brandeis emphasized the due process clause. My own preference has
been to stress the remedial and procedural dimensions of constitutional provisions with
a specific subject matter, such as the first amendment. See Monaghan, supra note 82.
On occasion the Supreme Court seems inclined to the latter mode of exposition. See,
e.g., California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3451 (1983) ("[T]he Court's principal con-
cern has been more with the procedure by which the State imposes the death sentence
than with the substantive factors the State lays before the jury .. "). In general, how-
ever, the Court follows Brandeis, insisting that the general prohibition against govern-
ment intrusions contained in the fourth amendment and in the due process clause takes
on a special meaning where important substantive constitutional values-such as free-
dom of speech-are at stake. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319
(1979).
168. In the first amendment area, for example, the Court might accept administra-
tive factfinding by administrative agencies with ongoing, carefully structured adjudica-
tory apparatus, see Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), while insisting on independent
judicial factfinding where the agency might be thought to be infected with systemic bias
against the free speech claim, see, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 82, at 523 (movie cen-
sors), or where the agency meets so occasionally that it might be thought to lack suffi-
cient institutional safeguards-for example, school disciplinary panels.
169. These commentators placed major reliance on the Supreme Court's failure to
mention the rule in a subsequent rate case, Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 573, 581-82 (1940). See, e.g., K. Davis, Handbook on Administrative Law
§ 255 (1951). But the decline of Crowell's importance in the rate-setting area seems
more properly attributable to an abandonment of the requirement of a judicial record,
see supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text, and to an important change in the con-
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cize the distinction between constitutional and ordinary facts, both
practically and theoretically. It was insisted that no workable line be-
tween the two categories existed,' 70 and that the practical imperatives
of public administration were at variance with attempting any such dis-
tinction. 17 ' Moreover, not only would the text of article III not support
such a distinction, reliance upon article III could not explain Ben Avon,
a case originating in the state courts.' 72 The resulting uncertainty over
both the theory and reach of Crowell led to a marked decline in overt
judicial reliance upon its authority. Indeed, at one time the fashion was
to pronounce the constitutional fact doctrine dead. 173
While commentators focused on Crowell's decline in the field of ad-
ministrative law, they began to notice that constitutional fact review had
become the operative measure of the Supreme Court's general appel-
late jurisdiction.' 74 Norris v. Alabama,17 5 decided just two years after
Crowell and in the same year as St. Joseph Stock Yards, is the watershed
case. There the Court reversed a holding of the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama that no impermissible racial exclusion from state juries had been
proved. The Court framed its task in terms identical to those stated by
the Bose Court:
The question is of the application of this established principle
to the facts disclosed by the record. That the question is one
of fact does not relieve us of the duty to determine whether in
truth a federal right has been denied. When a federal right
has been specially set up and claimed in a state court, it is our
province to inquire not merely whether it was denied in ex-
press terms but also whether it was denied in substance and
trolling substantive constitutional law. In FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944), the Court introduced flexibility in the rate setting process by minimizing the
concept of a "fair return." Until then, as Professor Dickinson had earlier noted, the
"fact-issue of the fair value of the property [was] decisive on the constitutionality of
every rate order." Dickinson, supra note 16, at 1072. After Hope, confiscation chal-
lenges to rate orders became practically irrelevant. See L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at
649-50; Strong, supra note 17, at 227.
170. See, e.g., J. Landis, supra note 124, at 131; Dickinson, supra note 16, at
1069-72; Schwartz, Does the Ghost of Crowell v. Benson Still Walk, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 163,
171 (1949).
171. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937); Dickin-
son, supra note 16, at 1077-82.
172. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920); see
also Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 271 U.S. 208, 211 (1926) (reaffirming
that Ben Avon is grounded in due process clause of fourteenth amendment). The diffi-
culty in relying on article III is that it requires independent judgment on all questions of
law when an article III court is asked to enforce an administrative order against private
parties. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 336-46. It is not clear whether Hart's
reference to independent judgment on "questions of law" extends to law application.
See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 20-21.
173. For citations to obituary notices, see M. Redish, Federal Courts: Cases, Com-
ments, and Questions 193 (1983).
174. See L.Jaffe, supra note 17, at 645 n.86; Strong, supra note 17, at 240-83.
175. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
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effect. If this requires an examination of evidence, that exami-
nation must be made. Otherwise, review by this Court would
fail of its purpose in safeguarding constitutional rights. Thus,
whenever a conclusion of law of a state court as to a federal
right and findings of fact are so intermingled that the latter
control the former, it is incumbent upon us to analyze the facts
in order that the appropriate enforcement of the federal right
may be assured. 176
The Court reviewed the evidence, including books containing the jury
rolls, 177 in a thorough manner and concluded that "the evidence re-
quired a different result from that reached in the state court." 178
After Norris, occasional doubts were expressed about the Supreme
Court's power to review "factual" matters when the case came from the
state courts.' 79 However, any special limitations on Supreme Court re-
view of state court factfinding and law application in constitutional
cases rested not on federalism principles, but on no longer extant statu-
tory restrictions on the Court's appellate jurisdiction.18 0 In any event,
all traces of doubt soon vanished. The Court's authority to make an in-
dependent judgment on constitutional law application became firmly
established, particularly in the areas of coerced confessions, jury dis-
crimination, and free speech.' 8 ' The formulas varied, to be sure.
Sometimes the Court insisted on its power to review "mixed" questions
176. Id. at 589-90.
177. Id. at 593 n.1.
178. Id. at 596. The Court added:
We think that the evidence that for a generation or longer no negro had been
called for service on any jury inJackson County, that there were negroes quali-
fied for jury service, that according to the practice of thejury commission their
names would normally appear on the preliminary list of male citizens of the
requisite age but that no names of negroes were placed on the jury roll, and the
testimony with respect to the lack of appropriate consideration of the qualifica-
tions of negroes, established the discrimination the Constitution forbids. The
motion to quash the indictment upon that ground should have been granted.
Id. The Court concluded that the state court's reliance upon the "mere general assever-
ations" of the jury commissioners to the contrary was not enough. Id. at 595. For other
illustrations of independent review injury discrimination cases, see Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282, 283 (1950); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 (1939).
179. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50-51 (1949) ("[AII those matters
which are usually termed issues of fact are for conclusive determination by the State
courts and are not open for reconsideration by this Court. Observance of this restric-
tion in our review of State courts calls for the utmost scruple."). Commentators have
tended to focus on Supreme Court review of state factfinding, see Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 7, at 574-620, without giving corresponding attention to Supreme Court
review of the findings of the lower federal courts.
180. Hill, supra note 120, at 946 n.18.
181. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 601-20; id. at 135-51 (Supp. 1981);
Strong, supra note 17, at 240-83. Of course, the Supreme Court cannot upset trial
court resolution of disputed "historical" facts, Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,
237-38 (1941), but even this limitation may not be significant, given the Court's ability
to reshape factual issues into legal ones. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct.
1735, 1739 n.5 (1984) ("Contrary to respondent's assertion, we do not review here the
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of law and fact; sometimes on the need for review because the conclu-
sions of law and the findings of fact were "intermingled"; sometimes on
the need to review the evidence to ensure that the federal right was not
denied in substance; and sometimes on the need to determine whether
sufficient evidence existed.18 2 These various formulas obscure the is-
sue. Laid bare, the point is more easily stated: the entire substance of
constitutional fact review had become the operative measure of the
Supreme Court's general appellate jurisdiction.
Some regard this development as an outgrowth of the premises of
Ben Avon, Ng Fung Ho, and Crowell.18 3 I think that is an error. Constitu-
tional fact review in those cases was concerned with the legitimacy of
the administrative state, with its substitution of administrative for judi-
cial adjudication. The dominant concern was the extent to which such
a process could displace the pattern of adjudication by regular courts
apparently contemplated by the 1787 Constitution. In terms of the
constitutional design, the whole process of substituting administrative
for judicial adjudication may be thought to suffer from a serious "legiti-
macy deficit."' 84 The constitutional fact doctrine is an effort to over-
come this problem, to reconcile the imperatives of the twentieth
century administrative state with the constitutional preference for adju-
dication by the regular courts. It does so by requiring, at a minimum,
that a court asked to enforce an administrative order must engage in
constitutional fact review. Perhaps the doctrine has a broader bite.' 8 5
But the important point is that it is concerned only with judicial control
of administrative conduct.
Quite plainly, no legitimacy deficit can be thought to exist in the
adjudications of the inferior courts. The constitutional plan contem-
plates that state courts can adjudicate federal claims, and that Congress
can establish lower federal courts. Accordingly, even on the doubtful
premise that judicial control of administrative conduct requires consti-
tutional fact review at the appellate level, 186 different justifications must
state courts' finding as a matter of 'fact'. ... [T]he question before us is the appropri-
ate legal standard .... ").
182. The various formulas are catalogued in Note, Supreme Court Review of State
Findings of Fact in Fourteenth Amendment Cases, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 328, 328-36 (1962).
183. See, e.g., Strong, supra note 17, at 240-83.
184. See Currie, supra note 101, at 443-45. I recognize that on principle this argu-
ment applies most clearly only at the federal level. A strong form of the argument ap-
plied at the state level would run into the doctrine that the Constitution does not impose
separation of powers on the states. See supra note 115. But history has its claim here:
it is no accident that the early due process cases evidenced a constitutional concern for
adequate state judicial control of state administrative conduct where private rights were
at stake. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
185. See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 20-24.
186. In Crowell, neither the Court nor Justice Brandeis adverted to possible differ-
ences between the role of the trial and appellate courts in the context of immediate
judicial review of administrative action. Their focus was on the independent judgment
requirement at large, so to speak.
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be adduced to support such intense review of the findings of inferior
judicial tribunals.
Despite the evident distinctions between judicial review of adminis-
trative action and judicial review of the conduct of inferior courts, some
cases seemingly assumed that constitutional law application was always
a task calling for the independent judgment of appellate courts. These
authorities need not be examined here. The most that can be said is
that they asssumed the necessity or propriety of independent appellate
review-they did not purport to demonstrate it.187 Moreover, in recent
times when the Supreme Court has spoken of the obligations of the
state courts, its most salient reliance has been on specific constitutional
guarantees, not on the constitutional fact doctrine of either Crowell or
Norris.t8 8 Thus, in Freedman v. Aaryland'8 9 the Court held that states
must provide judicial review of administrative determinations that cer-
tain speech is unprotected.' 9 0 Though it does not cite Freedman, Bose
follows this pattern, extending it to the appellate level.' 9 '
III. APPELLATE DuTY VERSUS APPELLATE DISCRETION
Thus far the Article has traced the development of the constitu-
tional fact doctrine. In the context of judicial review of administrative
action, constitutional fact review may be required because administra-
tive action suffers from a legitimacy deficit. But recognizing that some
court should review administrative action provides no basis for a fur-
ther demand that all subsequent reviewing courts exercise independent
judgment. Nor does it compel independent appellate review of the
findings of lower federal or state courts in ordinary civil and criminal
cases since there is no legitimacy deficit when these courts adjudicate
187. In St. Joseph Stock Yards, for example, the Supreme Court itself extensively re-
viewed claims relating to the fair value of the property as well as to the income to be
earned under the prescribed rates. See St.Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298
U.S. 38, 54-72 (1936). Justice Brandeis regarded the sufficiency of the evidence as a
question of law. See id. at 74-75 (Brandeis, J., concurring). In Ben Avon, Brandeis
viewed the question of whether there was "substantial evidence" in favor of the adminis-
trative findings as a question of law reviewable in the state supreme court as well as in
the trial court. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 296-97
(1920) (Brandeis,J., dissenting). And, in a little noticed line of cases involving the Fed-
eral Employers Liability Act, the Court regularly insisted that it had the duty to decide
de novo whether the injury had occurred in interstate commerce, a question then
deemed to be of constitutional significance. See Dickinson, supra note 16, at 1069-71.
188. See Monaghan, supra note 82, at 524 n.23 (specific constitutional guarantees
mandate judicial as opposed to administrative adjudication).
189. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
190. Id. at 58. The Court said that "only a judicial determination in an adversary
proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression." Id.
191. Cf. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 163 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring in
result) ("After the Court's decision today, there can be no doubt that [Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)] requires appellate courts-including this Court-to review in-
dependently the constitutional fact of obscenity.").
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constitutional claims. To be sure, appellate courts often exercise in-
dependent judgment with respect to constitutional law application. But
I see no persuasive case for converting this competence into a duty.
I do not doubt that, by statute, appellate courts can be charged
with the responsibility for constitutional law application, to ensure that,
on the evidence, any constitutional right has not been erroneously de-
nied by a lower federal or state court. No litigant's personal rights are
infringed by such review,192 nor do special federalism considerations
forbid it.19 3 But, to my mind, independentjudgment on the evidence is
constitutionally mandated only when the application issue involves an
appreciable measure of additional norm elaboration-that is, where it
seems correct to state that the judicial duty to "say what the law is" is
implicated. I accept, however, that firmly embedded precedent estab-
lishes more: appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, have the
authority to engage in constitutional fact review in any case, at least
absent restrictive legislation. As will be seen, this competence can be
supported by justifications going beyond history. However, our imme-
diate concern is with the claim that appellate courts are under a duty to
undertake such review.
A. Appellate Duty
Bose insists that appellate courts must exercise independent judg-
ment with respect to constitutional facts relevant to first amendment
law application. But to what extent are appellate judges obligated
outside the first amendment context to undertake constitutional fact re-
view in all constitutional cases? This question, it should be noted,
arises in an extraordinary variety of contexts. For example, must each
tier in the state appellate court system make an independent judgment
on whether enough evidence exists to support a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt, ' 94 or on whether a specific juror was rightly disquali-
fied because of his views on the death penalty? 195 Is the Supreme
Court itself required to make a similar determination, at least in the
cases in which it grants review? The day cannot be far off when the
Court will be faced with the need for a systematic analysis of the entire
problem. At that point the Court will see that there are a wide range of
192. My argument assumes the inapplicability of the jury trial guarantees. See Bose,
104 S. Ct. at 1964 n.27; supra note 28.
193. Hill, supra note 120, at 946 n.18.
194. Cf.Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-20 (1977) (federal appellate courts
reviewing criminal conviction must determine whether evidence supports the finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). As Professor Wechsler notes, this is a substantial
question "that can[not] easily be turned aside." Wechsler, The AppellateJurisdiction of
the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1043, 1058-59 (1977).
195. Cf. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 853, 857 (1985) (reviewing court in
federal habeas proceeding must defer to state trial judge's findings about specific juror's
bias against death penalty if findings "fairly supported by the record").
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constitutional challenges in which the Court does not see itself under
an inexorable duty to engage in constitutional fact review.
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board'9 6 is an excellent
recent example of limited review of constitutional law application.
Over commerce and due process clause objections, the Court upheld
application of a state tax to the income of a domestic corporation's for-
eign subsidiaries. In apparently enlarging the concept of a "unitary
business," the decision has been widely interpreted as significantly ex-
panding state taxing power.' 9 7 Curiously, however, no attention has
been paid to an aspect of the case that virtually ensured that result.
The taxpayer contended that whatever the appropriate legal standard
for a unitary business, an important issue remained whether it was one,
and on that question it was entitled to the Court's independent judg-
ment. The Court's response is puzzling:
The legal principles defining the constitutional limits on the
unitary business principle are now well established. The fac-
tual records in such cases, even when the parties enter into a
stipulation, tend to be long and complex, and the line between
"historical fact" and "constitutional fact" is often fuzzy at
best. . . . It will do the cause of legal certainty little good if
this Court turns every colorable claim that a state court erred
in a particular application of those principles into a de novo ad-
judication, whose unintended nuances would then spawn fur-
ther litigation and an avalanche of critical comment. Rather,
our task must be to determine whether the state court applied
the correct standards to the case; and if it did, whether its
judgment "was within the realm of permissible judgment."' 198
In a footnote, the Court added that "[t]his approach is, of course, quite
different from the one we follow in certain other constitutional con-
texts," 19 9 citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and a case involving
Supreme Court review of a coerced confession claim.200 The Court
made no effort to justify an approach "quite different" from that taken
with respect to other constitutional claims, and some justification seems
required. After all, the records in first amendment and coerced confes-
sion cases can be "long and complex," and the "line between 'historical
fact' and 'constitutional fact' " is often "fuzzy at best." More impor-
tant, the Container Corp. Court never explained why either consideration
is of constitutional moment.
Container Corp. might rest on an unarticulated and undefended neo-
196. 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).
197. E.g., The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 112 (1983). There
has been an intense lobbying effort at both the national and state level to curtail unitary
tax schemes. See Pressure Grows on States to Reject World-Wide Unitary Tax System,
Wall St.J., Dec. 28, 1984, at 15, col. 4.
198. 103 S. Ct. at 2946 (citation & footnote omitted).
199. Id. at 2946 n.13.
200. Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967).
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Brandeisian premise: only "personal" constitutional rights, or some
kinds of personal rights, warrant close appellate scrutiny. 20 1 If so, the
source and limits of any such distinction are not apparent. Nor does
the current Supreme Court seem to think that the scope of appellate
review should be a function of behavioral assumptions that distortions
will occur because the litigants are asserting unpopular personal rights.
The Court's recent race discrimination and testimonial compulsion
cases are especially noteworthy here. Despite Norris v. Alabama, the
Court has declined to exercise independent judgment in the context of
schools20 2 and voting.20 3 In both contexts, the Court has said that im-
permissible "intent" is properly viewed as a question of fact. 20 4 But
surely intent in such contexts is far removed from the garden variety of
factual inquiry. Intent to discriminate is itself simply a construct re-
flecting numerous complex inferences. 20 5 Similarly, in United States v.
Doe,20 6 decided in the same term as Bose, the Court again sounded the
deference trumpet. At issue was whether compulsion to produce docu-
ments required the taxpayer "to perform an act that may have testimo-
nial aspects and an incriminating effect," in violation of the fifth
amendment. 20 7 The Court said that it would accept the district court's
"determination of factual issues . . . unless it has no support in the
record." 208
No less than the question of actual malice, questions of intentional
segregation and testimonial compulsion could have been held entitled
to constitutional fact review.20 9 These inconsistencies should not be
dismissed as involving nothing more than esoteric and unimportant
201. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
202. Characterizing the holding in Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526
(1979), the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principle that "whether the defend-
ants had intentionally maintained a racially segregated school system at a specified time
in the past [is] essentially factual, subject to the clearly-erroneous rule." Pullman-Stan-
dard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982). Swint itself involved a federal statutory claim.
203. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). The Court found that the district court
had applied "the proper legal standard," id. at 622, and that its factual findings were not
clearly erroneous.
204. E.g., Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623; Swint, 456 U.S. at 288.
205. The Court seemed to recognize this point in Rogers. See 458 U.S. at 622. For
a careful examination of the problem, see Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board:
Segregative Intent and the De Facto/Dejure Distinction, 86 Yale L.J. 317 (1976).
206. 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984).
207. Id. at 1242.
208. Id. at 1243. Presumably the Court's deferential approach applies equally to
review of lower court rejections of constitutional claims.
209. Why is it, for example, that courts should defer to a magistrate's conclusion
regarding the existence of probable cause to justify issuance of a warrant? See Massa-
chusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984); see also Deary v. Three Un-named Police
Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1984) (probable cause is an "ultimate fact" for
the jury) (citing cases). Is the only explanation that the exclusionary rule is not constitu-
tionally grounded? See infra text accompanying notes 211-13. Or is it that a magistrate
counts as a "court" for purposes of the constitutional prohibition?
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points of federal jurisdiction, of concern only to the litigants. That the
Court sees itself under a duty to exercise independent judgment with
respect to some, but not all, constitutional facts suggests that the Court
is proceeding on an ad hoc basis, failing to consider the systemic ramifi-
cations of its decisions.
More important, the erratic and uncertain state of Supreme Court
doctrine has serious consequences in a system of constitutional govern-
ment. Even if the Court has a penetrating power of review, is talk of its
"duty" to engage in such review wholly illusory? If so, should we view
the Court's power of review as discretionary? Entirely unconstrained?
The confusion about these matters is unsettling. And this uncertainty
has an as yet little noticed byproduct: it leaves unclear the nature of the
responsibilities of the state and federal judges, both trial and appellate.
The current accretion of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction says
nothing, at least overtly, to other actors in the judicial system, particu-
larly the state courts.2 10
Thus, the question presses: does the Constitution require appel-
late courts to exercise independent judgment on adjudicative facts de-
cisive of constitutional law application? An attempt to justify such a
duty can take one of several forms, although upon examination I find
them unconvincing whether taken singly or in combination.
1. - All questions of constitutional law application could be
viewed as demanding independent appellate review because of the "im-
portance" of constitutional rights and immunities coupled with the cen-
tral role of courts in preserving the constitutional order.2 11 This
argument stresses the "importance" of constitutional values,2 1 2 rather
than the danger of distorted factfinding or law application by a specific
decisionmaker. While the argument has appeal, its ultimate conclusion
seems to be simply asserted, rather than persuasively justified. It is,
after all, not obvious that all constitutional rights are more valuable
than other rights simply because they are mentioned in the Constitu-
tion. If the argument simply reflects a naked bias in favor of constitu-
tional claims, one that seeks only to increase the likelihood that such
claims will be vindicated, the bias does not appear to be constitutionally
grounded. It is not a premise of our system that the courts are able to
detect every violation of the constitutional order.2 1 3
210. In the federal system, of course, there is no absense of guidance where, as in
Swit and Rogers, the Court characterizes specific issues as "factual" and therefore sub-
ject to clearly erroneous review. This characterization sends a signal to the lower appel-
late courts that, in the future, they need not engage in independent judicial review on
these issues.
211. This theory does not rest upon a general theory of vindicating federal
supremacy. See Note, supra note 182, at 330. Even if it did, it would be open to the
objections set out in the text.
212. See id.
213. For example, the intent standard of the equal protection clause cases quite
plainly will permit some unconstitutional legislative actions to survive judicial challenge
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To my mind, the real center of this argument is a premise that ad-
ditional intensive judicial review at the appellate level is needed to pre-
vent an "intolerable" level of incorrectly decided cases-incorrect in
the special sense that some court has improperly rejected a constitu-
tional claim. The notion is that the greater the number of courts that
look at an issue, the greater the possibility of a "correct" decision. But
we have no clear idea of what it means to say that we face the danger of
an "intolerable" level of incorrectly denied constitutional claims.
Neither the empirical nor the normative reference points for this argument are
obvious.
Absent a coherent and convincing theory about the dangers posed
by incorrectly denied constitutional claims, I believe that the important
judicial role in preserving the constitutional order is adequately insured
by the universal judicial duty to expound and refine the applicable con-
stitutional law. 2 14 When necessary, that duty includes further elabora-
tion of the relevant constitutional norms. For I quite agree withJustice
Holmes that frequently recurring fact patterns-for example, whether a
reporter must check his sources-warrant specific judicial norm elabo-
ration rather than being left to the trier of fact under a more general
standard. 21 5 But it remains to be demonstrated that more is necessary;
that is, that the system of civil liberties is in material danger unless both
the trial and all appellate courts are required to render independent
judgment on every application of constitutional norms to the facts. 216
2. - The general argument that all constitutional rights need the
security of independent appellate review can be abandoned in favor of
an argument that the first amendment is special. Two different forms
of this argument can be distinguished. The first places stress on the
importance of the right rather than upon the dangers of systemically
distorted factfinding and law application. The familiar "chilling effect"
rhetoric asserts that first amendment values are very fragile and espe-
cially vulnerable to an "intolerable" level of deterrence; and the danger
of impermissible deterrence is real, as is evidenced by the high rate of
because the Court cannot penetrate the legislative motive. See J. Ely, Democracy and
Distrust 138 (1980).
214. This duty includes an examination of the adequacy of the evidence to support
the conclusion of the court below. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
215. "But supposing a state of facts often repeated in practice, is it to be imagined
that the court is to go on leaving the standard to the jury forever?" 0. Holmes, supra
note 48, at 98; see United States v. Boyle, 105 S. Ct. 687, 692 n.8 (1985) ("When faced
with a recurring situation ... the Courts of Appeals should not be reluctant to formu-
late a clear rule of law to deal with that situation."). Thus, at some point, the Court must
elaborate whether under the actual malice rule a reporter must investigate his sources.
E.g., Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
216. It should be noted, however, that Ben Avon and Crowell may require that some
court make an independent judgment on the law application point, at least before it can
enforce the determination of an administrative agency. See supra notes 117-35 and
accompanying text.
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appellate reversal in first amendment cases 21 7 and by the specter of
large damage awards in these suits. 2 18 Even accepting the validity of
these arguments, 2 19 the necessity for a "several bites at the apple" ap-
proach again remains undemonstrated. Freedman v. Maryland 220 may be
taken to establish that administrative action focusing on the content of
speech cannot be final, and that the Constitution requires independent
judicial judgment on whether the speech is protected.2 21 Perhaps, too,
the first amendment guarantees a right to some appellate review.222
But it is a long way from accepting this set of propositions to a conclu-
sion that we will end up with an "intolerable" degree of chilling effect
unless all appellate courts are required to redetermine every instance of
first amendment law application.223
Bose attempts to recast the special nature of the first amendment in
a way that places more emphasis on the dangers of distorted factfinding
and law application: first amendment interests are especially vulnera-
ble due to the general character of the first amendment rules them-
selves. 224 The rules-such as the actual malice standard-are simply
too indeterminate to be left for application by a trier of fact, even an
article III district judge.225 Of course, this argument depends entirely
upon the premises previously discussed: without independent appel-
late review on constitutional law application, there will be an intolera-
ble level of mistakes in denial of first amendment defenses. 226
Moreover, the argument indiscriminately lumps together all first
amendment rules. Perhaps in defamation cases there is such an intrac-
217. See supra note 10.
218. See Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996-97 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork,
J., concurring).
219. But see Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 36-38.
220. 380 U.S. 51 (1965); see supra text accompanying notes 188-91. I recognize
that Freedman rests at least as much on the danger of distortions in factfinding and law
application as on the importance of first amendment rights.
221. See Monaghan, supra note 82, at 522-23.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
223. The appellate reversal cases, supra note 10, do not sustain the burden of dem-
onstrating the necessity of independent appellate review without a breakdown showing a
high rate of reversal on "straight" law application grounds. The first amendment seems
secure by the standard appellate duty to deal with norm elaboration and the power to
exercise independent appellate judgement. To convert the latter power into a duty
seems to me to be unjustified.
224. See 104 S. Ct. at 1961-62.
225. But see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev.
844, 883-90 (1970) (defamation rules sufficiently precise).
226. Cf. Blasi, The First Amendment and the Pathological Perspective, 85 Colum.
L. Rev. 449 (1985) (carefully crafted judicial doctrine can protect speech in repressive
times). But see Nagel, How Useful is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 Cornell
L. Rev. 302 (1984) (arguing that level of free speech in society does not depend materi-
ally on the Court's pronouncements on the scope of the first amendment). See gener-
ally H. McClosky & A. Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance (1983) (suggesting a wide variety
of factors that affect the development of civil libertarian ideals).
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table problem of confusing falsity with malice that layers of de novo
appellate review are warranted.227 But it is hard to believe that all first
amendment rules suffer from indeterminacy defects that create compa-
rable risks of misadministration. 228 What is more, it is not apparent
that first amendment rules are less precise than other rules of constitu-
tional privilege. 229 To my eye, therefore, the allegedly indeterminate
nature of first amendment rules does not supply an adequate basis for a
special constitutional duty of independent appellate review for first
amendment claims. 230
3. - A final argument can be framed in terms of stare decisis.
Rightly or wrongly, the Court has repeatedly insisted that appellate
courts have a duty to make an independent judgment in the first
amendment context and elsewhere. I would be among the last to dis-
count the importance of adherence to precedent. 23 1 In the first amend-
ment context, the argument from precedent is conclusive, at least for
me. But one must not overstate the scope of the precedent. The duty
posited by Bose does not establish a right to appellate review in first
amendment cases.232 Thus, Bose notwithstanding,,I would think it en-
tirely constitutional for appellate courts to continae to decline discre-
tionary review over cases involving no more than application of settled
first amendment norms to the facts.
Outside the first amendment area the precedent argument seems
even more problematic. To be sure, there are cases like Norris that em-
227. The so-called "distinction" between precise and indeterminate first amend-
ment rules has long been at the bottom of overbreadth analysis. Several commentators
on the overbreadth doctrine drew upon considerations analogous to those relied upon
in Bose. They argued that courts could limit first amendment statutes to constitutional
boundaries only where the applicable limiting rule was sufficiently "precise." One com-
mentator, for example, thought that the Supreme Court's defamation and obscenity
rules were sufficient, but that its sedition rule was not. See Note, supra note 225, at
883-90, 897-907. This argument is criticized in Monaghan, supra note 219, at 18-23.
228. The first amendment rules, it should be noted, are a long way from the gen-
eral standards, such as reasonableness, that Holmes thought were an insufficient basis
upon which to charge a jury. See 0. Holmes, supra note 48, at 97-98.
229. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 609 ("Is the New York Times standard
as to 'malice' less precise than most rules of constitutional law? Of law generally? Is it
incapable of being applied by lower courts and juries with a reasonable degree of relia-
bility?") (footnote omitted).
230. There is, to be sure, a first amendment due process, a special concern for
procedural protection adequately sensitive to first amendment interests. See
Monaghan, supra note 82. But one must be on guard against the danger of "double-
counting" the first amendment interest. See Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1488
(1984).
231. Monaghan, supra note 79, at 387-91; Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court
Opinions Seriously, 39 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1979).
232. To demonstrate such a right would require a different form of argument. It
may be that the Court is now prepared to hold that the first amendment presupposes
some appellate review. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. But, whether the
first amendment also presupposes review in the Supreme Court is a different issue.
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phasizejudicial duty. The coerced confession cases are a salient exam-
ple. But it is apparent that the precedent is much weaker here.2 33 I see
no reason to extend the existing support for an appellate duty to en-
gage in constitutional fact review. As the next section shows, appellate
discretion adequately permits courts to protect the constitutional
order.
B. Appellate Discretion
Constitutional fact review at the appellate level is a potent doctrine
even if viewed in discretionary rather than mandatory terms.23 4 When
courts should exercise that discretion depends on a careful assessment
of relevant policy considerations. Thus, even if, as I have argued, the
"importance" of constitutional values does not yield a solid basis for
constitutional fact review in the Supreme Court, other institutional con-
cerns may do so. Two such concerns stand out: first, the danger of
systemic bias of other actors in the judicial system; second, the per-
ceived need for a case-by-case development of the law in a given
area.
23 5
233. See, e.g., Estelle v.Jurek, 450 U.S. 1014, 1014 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari) (suggesting in broad terms that application of the in-
dependent judgment rule is not required in challenges to voluntary confession).
234. Treating constitutional fact review as a discretionary power in the Supreme
Court poses no novel theoretical difficulties, at least where review is denied. For in-
stance, the statutes governing appellate review may be taken to authorize discretionary
review. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947) (Court dismisses on
discretionary grounds an appeal from state supreme court that satisfies article III and
seemingly fits language of 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 656-62.
Difficulties may arise, however, in the context of Supreme Court review of the state
supreme courts, because an essentially discretionary concept of constitutional fact re-
view must be integrated with the adequate and independent state ground doctrine. The
issue is whether the doctrine acts to bar review of constitutional law application. It
seems plain enough that if the state supreme court has passed on the application point,
its disposition is open in the Supreme Court. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 856
n. I (1985). Moreover, though this is less clear on principle or authority, review would
also appear to be available if the state supreme court, invoking its discretionary power of
review, has refused to pass on the application point. See Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S.
375, 383 (1955).
If, as a matter of state law, the state supreme court cannot pass on an application
point, the issue becomes more difficult. If the premises of Bose are disregarded, it is hard
for me to see any other source for a federal compulsion that the state supreme court
entertain the application challenge, if the law governing its jurisdiction precludes it.
Even so, the consequences of the state supreme court's refusal to entertain an applica-
tion challenge are unclear, and one might imagine the awkward situation of Supreme
Court review to two state courts in the same case: the state supreme court on the law
declaration issue and the lower state court on the law application issue.
235. A third institutional concern that may provide a basis for independent judg-
ment by the Supreme Court is the necessity of an authoritative decision to settle an issue
of enormous practical importance. See, e.g., United States v. Maine, 53 U.S.L.W. 4151,
4152 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985); Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S. Ct. 2433, 2439 (1984). I do
not pause here to consider the relevance of this concern for constitutional fact review.
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1. - The need to guard against systemic bias brought about or
threatened by other actors in the judicial system appears to be an im-
portant force behind the Supreme Court's exercise of constitutional
fact review. It is no accident that the most salient modern examples of
constitutional fact review are found in Supreme Court review of the
state courts. Norris and its progeny proceed on a premise of institu-
tional distrust: constitutional fact review in the Supreme Court is nec-
essary not because of the danger of occasional mistakes but because of
the fear of systematic distortion of factfinding and law application. The
coerced confession cases are illustrative. 236 Even if it is assumed that
racial discrimination is no longer a serious problem in such cases, the
danger remains that the question whether a crucial confession was vol-
untary will be overshadowed by considerations affecting its
reliability. 23 7
The premise that state courts are to be suspected of distorted
factfinding and law application is disquieting. After all, the Constitu-
tion presupposes that the state courts will enforce declared federal law
fairly. To be sure, the constitutional plan leaves to Congress the power
to vary the normal presupposition, but absent clear legislative direc-
tion, it is not easy to see how any general distrust of the state courts can
be a premise for judicial reasoning about the scope of the Supreme
Court's appellate review.23 8 Still, reality has intruded here, and for
nearly five decades the Court has, in substance, asserted a power to
respond to perceived dangers of distorted factfinding and law applica-
tion in the state courts. 239 It is true that the rules announced governing
the scope of review are now stated to be equally applicable to both state
236. See Note, supra note 182, at 342-46.
237. SeeJackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 369, 382-87 (1964). The death penalty cases
might also be thought of in these terms. It has long been a matter of grave concern that
blacks are far more frequently found to qualify for the death penalty than are whites
under the applicable state statutes. See, e.g., Meltzer, Capital Punishment: On Death
Row, The Wait is Over, 239 The Nation 274, 275 (1984). Constitutional fact review may
lessen the chances of racially based miscarriages ofjustice. The question is not what the
appellate court is constitutionally obligated to do, but what it may do. It is arguable,
however, that eighth amendment due process requires that at least some state appellate
court engage in constitutional fact review.
238. See Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1980-81 (1984); Middlesex County Eth-
ics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982) ("Minimal respect for
the state processes, of course, precludes any presumption that the state courts will not
safeguard federal constitutional rights."). Statutes enforcing civil rights and conferring
enforcement jurisdiction on the district courts do reflect a distrust premise, of course.
See Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function,
94 Yale L.J. 71, 72 & nn.8-9, 111-12 (1984). But a civil rights plaintiff suing on such a
statute in the state rather than the federal courts, see Gordon & Gross, Justiciability of
Federal Claims in State Court, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1145 (1984), does not seem to me
entitled to a presumption that the state courts will engage in distorted factfinding or law
application.
239. The burdensome character of the task has impelled the Court toward stating
more rigid constitutional rules, H. Wechsler, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties and
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and federal courts.2 40 But the real bite of intensive review has been on
the decisions of state courts. A discretionary, rather than a mandatory,
conception of constitutional fact review seems more responsive to the
felt need for such control.24' It permits the Court to recognize that not
all constitutional adjudication in the state courts presents the same dan-
gers of distortion, but that there may be appropriate occasions for in-
tensive review. For example, there is an obvious potential for distorted
findings present in state court application of the unitary business stan-
dard in taxation cases. Thus, in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Board242 the Court should have eschewed its deferential approach in
favor of discretionary constitutional fact review.2 43
2. - To my mind, the perceived need for case-by-case develop-
ment of constitutional norms is likely to be the single most important
trigger for constitutional fact review. 244 Where such norms are in a
process of development, the Court must examine enough factually sim-
ilar situations to formulate an acceptable norm. 24 5 The point is not
that the line between law declaration and law application is so thin that
the practical exigencies of the appellate process, both in screening
cases and producing opinions, should be taken to permit constitutional
fact review. Rather, the argument is an affirmative one: norm elabora-
tion occurs best when the Court has power to consider fully a series of
closely related situations involving a claim of constitutional privilege.
The fourth amendment cases come readily to mind. To the de-
spair of some commentators, these cases show that the contours of
what constitutes a reasonable search or seizure are hammered out in a
case-by-case manner. Consequently, the Supreme Court has engaged
in intensive review of specific applications of the governing constitu-
Civil Rights 18-19 (1968), and using the factfinding capacities of federal habeas corpus
courts.
240. See Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1959; Hill, supra note 120, at 946 n.18.
241. Treating constitutional fact review as discretionary permits the Supreme
Court to distinguish between state and federal courts and to distinguish further between
cases tried in federal court with and without a jury.
242. 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 196-200.
243. Given the central concern of the dormant commerce clause with self-prefer-
ring state conduct, it is singular that the dangers of misadministration are not men-
tioned by the Court. See N.Y. Times, June 28, 1983, at Al, col. 5 ($600,000,000 in
annual tax revenues at stake). The Court can be thought to have ceded far too much in
announcing a deferential approach; it can be argued that, on appropriate occasions, the
Court should engage in constitutional fact review to protect constitutional values against
distorted factfinding.
244. Whether further norm elaboration is desirable depends on an assessment of
complex policy considerations. Professor Greenawalt, for example, has recently under-
taken such an assessment in considering the advisability of further elaboration of the
norms governing justification and excuse, concluding that further elaboration is unwar-
ranted. See Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders ofJustification and Excuse, 84 Colum.
L. Rev. 1897 (1984).
245. Upon a careful reading, Colorado v. New Mexico might fit into this pattern. See
104 S. Ct. at 2439-42.
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tional norms.246 In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,247 to take a very recent exam-
ple, the Court held that the fourth amendment applied to searches by
school officials, and that such a search must be supported by "reason-
able suspicion" that it would yield evidence of a violation of school
rules or the law. The Court recognized that the state supreme court
had applied a substantially similar standard to the evidence to bar the
specific search. But the Court made its own independent review of the
evidence to show that the state court's decision "reflect[ed] a somewhat
crabbed notion of reasonableness. ' 248
A careful examination of the Supreme Court's recent habeas
corpus cases also shows a marked tendency toward a discretionary con-
cept of constitutional fact review, one that emphasizes the need for
such review only where the norms are perceived to be in need of addi-
tional elaboration on a case-by-case basis.24 9 Wainright v. Witt 250 is the
most recent example. There the Court reformulated the standard gov-
erning exclusion ofjurors opposed to the death penalty, and in the pro-
cess engaged in an extensive review of the conduct of the trial judge.
But the Court made plain that in the future the standard is sufficiently
clear to be left to the "factual" determination of the trial judge.25 1 By
contrast, in Strickland v. Washington,2 5 2 decided only two weeks after
246. Florida v. Rodriguez, 105 S. Ct. 308 (1984), involving airport searches, is a
graphic example. Justice Stevens, in dissent, objected to the ad hoc review exhibited by
the case. Id. at 311; cf.James v. Arizona, 105 S. Ct. 398, 405 (1984) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari) (charging Court with assuming that petition raised
only a law application decision).
247. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
248. Id. at 745. The "regulatory taking" cases afford another illustration. The
Court's efforts to define the point at which a regulation becomes a taking have resulted
not in rules, but in standards of rather indeterminate character. The result has been a
process of ad hoc decisions that seem in need of continuous clarification. See Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2874 (1984).
249. The currently controlling statute requires that deference be given to state
court findings of fact so long as they find substantial support in a fairly constructed
record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) (1982). The Court has insisted that the statute does not
require deference on "mixed" questions of law and fact, see Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S.
591, 597 (1982), a term that is, of course, readily susceptible of including all issues relat-
ing to the application of law to facts. Other decisions have pointed in this direction. See
Maggio v. Fulford, 103 S. Ct. 2261, 2264-65 (1983) (White, J., concurring); Sumner v.
Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 543-44 (1981). Nonetheless, a majority of the Court now seems
inclined to treat routine questions of law application as entitled to the statutorily man-
dated deference. For example, in Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984), the Supreme
Court held that the question whether an individual juror was sufficiently impartial is
"plainly one of historical fact," id. at 2891, resting largely on the demeanor of the wit-
ness. The Court relied on its earlier decision holding that whether a plea was voluntary
was also a question of "fact." Id. Indeed, in Patton the Court went further and held that
whether the trial was surrounded by excessive publicity was to be treated as essentially
"factual." Id. at 2889-91.
250. 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985).
251. Id. at 854-55.
252. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
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Bose, the Court held that a state court conclusion that counsel rendered
effective assistance-that is, that counsel's performance was objectively
reasonable and did not prejudice the defendant 2 -5 3-is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact, not subject to the presumption of correctness that
is accorded to state court findings of fact.2 54 To be sure, the standards
formulated in Strickland involve some case-specific, concrete determina-
tions of "historical fact." But at least for the foreseeable future, their
application-particularly that of reasonably effective counsel-will re-
quire considerable elaboration of the underlying constitutional norms.
This elaboration can best occur only when the Court has had experi-
ence on a case-by-case basis with the difficulties experienced by the
lower courts in applying the Court's general norms.
Finally, viewing constitutional fact review as most appropriate
where norms are being formulated and reformulated on a continuous
basis may reconcile the Supreme Court's use of the so-called "two
court" rule with the independent judgement rule.25 5 The two court
rule is a doctrine ofjudicial self-restraint fashioned by the Court for its
own governance; its operative content is that "ordinarily" the Court
will not review factual findings in which two lower federal courts have
concurred.25 6 The main bite of this rule seems to be in the nonconsti-
tutional area, 25 7 but it has had an erratic and uncertain play in the field
of constitutional law. For example, it has been invoked by the Court to
limit its review of a finding of intentional discrimination in the voting
context 25 8 and a finding of no testimonial self-incrimination in the fifth
amendment context.2 59 As has been noted, both contexts present is-
sues of law application where independent judgment could have been
undertaken. 2 60 The two court rule seems to surface only when the
Court senses that the controlling constitutional norm is sufficiently de-
253. Id. at 2065-68.
254. Id. at 2070. Significantly, the dissenters in Bose were with the majority in
Strickland; in fact, Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion. There is no inconsistency. The
Bose Court did not undertake further elaboration of the constitutional norm. Rather, as
noted, the Court felt that the actual malice standard's indeterminate character necessi-
tates independent appellate review of its application to the historical facts. Justice White
seems to have reached this conclusion at least implicitly. In Bose he argued that actual
knowledge should be treated as a question of historical fact. 104 S. Ct. at 1967. But he
thought that independent judgment would be required on the claim of recklessness, id.,
presumably because such a claim inevitably presents questions of an evaluative
character.
255. Professor Vivian Berger called this problem to my attention.
256. See R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 290-91 (1978).
257. See, e.g., Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 725, 730 n.5
(1985) (federal income tax); NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct.
2948, 2959 n.15 (1984) (antitrust); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 408-09 (1962) (secur-
ities); Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949) (patent).
258. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982).
259. United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (1984).
260. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
1985]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
terminate and stable in character, and perhaps on those occasions
where the Court is unwilling or unable to amplify further the control-
ling norm. 26'
CONCLUSION
Bose raises an important question: the extent to which appellate
courts are required to engage in constitutional fact review. When the
initial decisionmaker is an administrative agency, such review may be
compelled because administrative action suffers from a so-called legiti-
macy deficit. But that premise is inapposite to evaluate a similar de-
mand for independent appellate review of lower federal and state court
findings. The judicial duty of appellate courts is, I submit, limited to
saying what the law is. Thus, where law application necessitates an ap-
preciable measure of further constitutional norm elaboration, the ap-
pellate court's function is more accurately seen as law declaration, not
law application. Beyond that, it may be assumed that at least the fed-
eral appellate courts have authority to exercise independent judgment
with respect to adjudicative facts decisive of constitutional law applica-
tion. But it goes too far to convert this competence into a duty. And I
do not see Bose as presenting a persuasive case for treating the first
amendment differently.
261. Cf. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1959 n.16 (a finding of fact, "'even if made by two
courts'" below, may be reconsidered in the Supreme Court where it "'clearly implies
the application of standards of law'" or where the decision being reviewed ' 'cannot
escape broadly social judgments' ") (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S.
665, 670-71 (1944)).
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